ARABISM (URUBAH): A "CONCEALED" CULTURAL FACTOR IN THE ETHNIC "GAP" IN ISRAEL

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*The aims of this essay are: a) to point to the tendency to ignore the specificities of the impact made by Arab culture on the community gap and on the inter-ethnic encounter in Israel; (b) to assess possible reasons for this tendency, which is frequently found in the academic world as well as in the civil service, the media and in wide circles of public opinion.**

A DICHOTOMOUS PERSPECTIVE OF THE ETHNIC GAP OBSCURES PERCEPTION OF THE REAL CULTURAL VARIANT

Although the imprints of Arabism are profusely noticeable in the Jewish exiles arriving in Israel from Arab lands, the common academic approach overlooks them. To explain the community gap in Israel, the various modalities of socio-economic progress and/or advances and inhibitions in the modernisation process, materialistic causation has been invoked. It is claimed that precedence in length of residence in the country, relatively higher intellectual capabilities, preferential professional qualifications and initial capital brought with them from abroad have all helped European immigrants to take up key positions in Israeli politics and economy and to dictate their own value system. By taking advantage of the cheap labor and political naivete of Oriental immigrants, Ashkenazim entrenched their primacy for future generations and into the current period[1]. In contrast to the "man in the street", who is inclined to assess cultural differences according to taste criteria (how people cook, dress, furnish, pray, celebrate, etc.), academic assessment finds it convenient to focus on select employment categories (usually manual wage-earners as against professionals), average per-family income rates, size (density) of accommodation in relation to the number of members of the household, the ascriptive (ethnic) division of those serving in positions of authority or of those sentenced to prison terms, etc. In the more distant past, we find an absence of statistical data or of willingness to admit existing figures that could have pointed to socio-economic differences between immigrant groups.

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* This essay is due to be followed by others, for indication of the nature of ethnic differences due to Arabism.

There has been, then, a tendency to employ attitude research; in accordance with the Bogardus scale, "social distance" was examined, i.e. readiness to be neighbors, or friends, and, all the more so, in-laws of members of other communities. At this early stage, "mentality" was perceived as an achievement-affecting factor and thereby, also, as a factor affecting the climate of the inter-ethnic encounter in Israel. Particular attention was paid to negative sensitivities, such as those which had existed between Western (European) Jews and *Ostjuden* or between the Jewish communities of Iraq and Iran. A practical device to enhance the ingathering and successful "fusion of the exiles" was then settling them together. The social sciences were requested, *post factum*, to examine immigrant townships and rural communities lest the amalgam prove disharmonious.

The question is where to look first. The citizen (and the researcher *qua* citizen) forms his opinions by studying his surroundings: his colleagues at work, his comrades-in-arms, neighbors and relatives. What should the sociologist (in his role as researcher) study first? In the early 1950s, there were large waves of immigrants but no methodical research had as yet been conducted. Academic discussion concerned the essence of the ethnic gap: is it or is it not only a matter of technological skill? On the assumption that the Diaspora – then being ingathered from amongst seventy nations – was subject to a basic division into two, Frankenstein (1951a, 1951b), Rotenstreich (1951) and Simon (1951) discussed the correct pedagogic methodology that should be used by the absorbing part of the Israeli population in order to advance that part that was being absorbed[2]. The former was seen as modern, the latter primitive. The former, by implication, is entrusted with fostering European culture, while the latter, by implication[3], finds it difficult to break free of inhibitions imprinted upon it by the Muslim-Arab environment.

What is the origin of the tendency to classify immigrants from "seventy nations" into two categorical blocks? Scholars who find it convenient to classify thus apparently find it difficult to shake off "street culture", irrespective of whether they are part of it or it of them. The division of society into two camps, common among other nations and also in Jewish communities overseas[4] is affected by "dualistic" epistemology and endogenous sociological and psychological needs. There are, apparently, factors that mold social experience rather than reflecting an existing social reality[5], for the number of active camps amongst the Israeli public is certainly greater than two. As a matter of fact, research into the community gap focussed initially on those coming from underdeveloped countries. It is only the identification of these people, the commonly-used terms for describing the phenomenon, and the interpretation of their sources that change with academic fashion. For example, the identification of the weak: by the mid-sixties, sociologists were careful not to make explicit connection between the stratification patterns that were taking shape and the community distribution in Israeli society (Eisenstadt 1967: Ch. 7). Eisenstadt devotes only a few pages in his otherwise comprehensive work to this problem, but hints (1967: 176-177) that the ascription of "Oriental communities" or "Sephardim" (as against "Ashkenazim") is related to achievements which correspond to the status of the Israeli. Nevertheless, the academic world is troubled by distinctions between Oriental communities and Western communities, and even more so between the offspring of Ashkenazis and those of Sephardis, acceptable as they might be to the public.

Prior to the massive immigration of Maghreb Jewry ("Maghreb" literally means West of the Arab world), the category of "Oriental communities" was reserved for the communities of Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Persia, Bukhara, and the Yemen, who were among the veterans of Jewish settlement in the country[6]. The later identification of Maghreb Jewry as "Oriental" and, e.g., of Russian Jewry as "Western", is a distortion of geographical truth. Those who take issue with this classification propose greater accuracy by reference to "northern" and "southern" communities, a terminology that has not been adopted by the public. At the same time, the terms "Ashkenazi" (German) and "Sephardi" (Spanish) not only commemorate bitter historical events but also result in a distortion of the truth. Spanish Jewry, for example, dispersed after the Expulsion of 1492, reached Italy, France, England, the Lowlands, the Balkans, North Africa and America, with a small proportion arriving in Palestine and other countries of the Middle East. On the other hand, most of the "Sephardi" Jews of Iraq and Persia (Iran), and certainly those of the Yemen, Maharashtrah (Bombay) and Cochin had no contact for centuries with the communities of Spain. In conclusion, the Ashkenazi-Sephardi dichotomy is not a good one since it does not delineate Israelis clearly. By itself, it is not a good basis for explaining socio-economic differentiations in Israel.

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Since the 1960s, a new dichotomous term is in increasing use, juxtaposing and comparing those of "African-Asian descent" with those of "European-American descent" (cf. Lissak, 1969; Patenkin, 1969; Bar-Yosef, 1969; Simmon, 1969). This categorization is (relatively) preferable to those above mentioned, since it classifies successful "Sephardi" communities, such as those from Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, with the "Ashkenazis", because all of them originate from Europe. The suitability of these categories for sociological, economic and political comparisons is attested to by their acceptance by academics and, through them, by the Central Bureau of Statistics (cf. Matrass, 1969 and Baki, 1969) and other government bodies. Citing of the geographical connection between the level of progressiveness or backwardness of groups of citizens is convenient, since it is ostensibly neutral. The indicator for cultural components of influence is prominent, but not explicit. However, modernization is *not* determined by geography and it does not take much to realize that what counts is human behavior and not cartographical notation. Furthermore, although geographical classification accords a more authentic place to immigrants from the Balkans, it distorts the categorization of the communities of South Africa and South America, both of which are largely ascribed to Ashkenazi communities. For the Latin Americans, the categorization is made irrespective of the surrounding Spanish culture and, in many cases, ignores the origin of many of the communities there, whose forebears migrated to the New World from Middle Eastern countries.

Movement of migrants, including Jewish migrants, which became particularly intensive from the second half of the 19th century[7], and resulted in a mixing of "Spanish" and "German" communities in "western" and "eastern" cultural zones, further hampers classification of the population according to geographic criteria. The question that arises, for example, with respect to the classification of immigrants from France, the children or grandchildren of Jews who left Algeria, becomes more serious in relation to

"sabras" (native-born Israelis), since it concerns the category classification of Israeli culture: Is it European or Asian? What should determine the category with respect to families which made a number of stops before their descendants finally moved to Israel; should it be length of sojourn in each country, or chronological order?

It was the feeling that the current geographical criterion camouflages, rather than clarifying issues, that, from the mid-sixties, led to a new definition of the weaker groups in the country as those "coming from Muslim countries" (as distinguished from those "from Christian countries", though the latter term is not in use). (Cf. Adler, 1969; Lissak, 1969; Yadlin, 1969.) This term, suggesting, as it does that the Muslim tradition delays modernization processes is relatively convenient for the academic world but less so for the politicians. The latter desire conciliation with the world of Islam and pay lip service to its famous Golden Age. For this reason and due to public sensitivities, use of this term is limited and it is not taking root in academic circles.

Theologians, sociologists and orientalists who specialize in the history and culture of Islam approach with caution the question of how (if at all) its influence can impede progress. At the beginning of this century[8], penetrating studies provided answers which led to critical theoretical formulations. By disregarding these studies, researchers are able to move to moderate formulations, which become toned down concomitantly with the process of national liberation of the Muslim countries and their growing strength in the international arena (Lewis, 1976). In order to ensure that Muslim communities remain open for continued research and agree to grant research funds and publication rights, the researcher must avoid writing in any way that could be interpreted as prejudicial to their image. This reality holds true for universities in Europe and America, and even more so for Israeli academics. Israel's desire to integrate and take root in the region entails the building of bridges to the neighboring peoples. It is feared that detrimental reference to the image of Muslim countries could adversely affect the welfare of Jewish communities living amongst them or the image of immigrants to Israel from those countries. It would not be justified methodically to regard the Jews as imbued with the impeding influence of Islamic tradition. For example, those descended from the communities expelled from Spain or immigrants from the Balkan countries, who lived for centuries under Muslim regimes, would, thereby, be returned to the category of the underprivileged, and this division does not accord with the statistical facts[9].

The kernel of truth (however difficult to grasp) is that certain distinct socio-economic-political (SEP) criteria mark off people who have come from Arab countries. There is an apparent "amnesia" which blurs the perception and memory of the immediate past. This is a symptom of a national phobia that reflects the grave conflict between the demands of the outer world and those of Israeli society, striving to preserve the organization that Israelis have painfully developed in their defensive struggle. Two distinct epistemological problems are involved here: a) acknowledgment of the "intervening variable" of culture (in our case, Arab culture) in operations recorded in SEP spheres, and thereupon the divergent course of modernization in the Arab world; and b) awareness of the SEP imprints of Arabism on Arab-Jewish communities and consequently, the basic similarities of the two cultures.

OVERLOOKING THE SEAL OF ARABISM IN SEP PATTERNS: AN INTELLECTUAL PREDICAMENT

The unique traits of "Arabism" were molded by the ecology of Near Eastern deserts, as reflected in the mode of life of pastoral nomads to this day (Ibn Khaldun, 1958). Recurrent waves of nomads invaded sedentary regions, mostly after having adopted Muhamedanism, and brought the vanquished peoples to emulate their patterns of culture. The historical facts are a matter of common knowledge; nevertheless, scholars have had difficulty in drawing the implicit consequences.

The identification of the potential for progress and, on the other hand, of the reasons for lagging behind with religious doctrines (Weber, 1958) is destined, by its very nature, to be inaccurate in detail and may offend believers. Nevertheless, this approach obviates the need to locate the causes of backwardness at the weak points in national cultures.

Far more fraught with hazard is the attempt to relate modernizing potential to national traditions. Firstly, location of causal relationships in the plurality of the phenomena of life requires profound study of the daily activities of individuals and groups. This is undubitably a more demanding task than analysis of dogmatic holy writings. Secondly, the national cultural tradition of myths and ritual, anchored in the age-old collective conscious and subconscious, is stronger than any nuance of religious dogma (Gibb, 1945). Thus there is greater reluctance to attribute negative traits ("inhibiting factors") to customs that are entrenched in the nation than to those attached to religious practices. Hesitation to ascribe "weakness' to impediments deriving from the laws of Islam increases when the impediments originate in the customs (*'urf*) of the Arab peoples. The hesitation of Israeli scholars stems from unique impetuses.

a) The traditional tale of Isaac and Ishmael (Goldberg, 1980); the biblical attitude to ancient peoples such as the Ishmaelites, the Amelekites, the Midianites and the Hagariyim or Arabeeyim[10]; the impoverishment of Eretz Israel after the Arab conquest, the status of Jewish communities under Arab regimes[11], and, finally, the current Arab-Israel dispute.

b) Scholars elsewhere are aware of the emotional vulnerability of Israeli academics. As a result Israeli academics must take precautions against ill-speakers in the international academic community who find it convenient to disqualify the work of Israelis, and even of Jews in general, as being unbalanced[12]

c) The extent of the threat of the *'urubah* that has been "infiltrating" Israeli society and affecting conventions and manners deters those who favour the "Western", modern image of the State of Israel (cf. Cohen, 1983; Eisenstadt, 1983) and leads them to suppress the unpleasant facts.

d) A further factor hampering the Israeli scholar is the network of inter-community relations in the country: to impute that any trait of Arab culture is negative impinges on the honor of Jews from Arab countries, just as attribution of a negative connotation to one of the customs of Jews from the Arab world, by implication, casts aspersions on Arabs. The question of the uniqueness of Jewish communities in their Arab-Muslim cultural environment, the similarities and the differences, thus

becomes a touchy one. It might be helpful to isolate the *'urubah* heritage from the Turkish-Ottoman, Persian or Berber culture, in order to make a more accurate diagnosis of the salient and valid elements in respect to SEP limitation. Because of the sensitivity of the issue, however, this is not done.

THE ATTEMPT TO LIKEN JEWS TO ARABS AND JUDAISM TO ISLAM VIOLATES CONVENTION

According to unwritten conventions, the linguistic combination "Arab-Jews" or "Arabs of the Mosaic persuasion" is prohibited. There are those who urge caution lest the Jews of the Arab world be identified, unintentionally, with the enemy (cf. Michael, 1974: 22). Others say that this formulation is insulting, helps create negative community stereotypes and disturbs the harmony necessary for the ingathering of the exiles[13]. The feeling that grave insult to others is unjustifiable, even for scientific purposes alone, is shared by social and cultural researchers who were[14], and still are, mainly Ashkenazis.

It originates in the view that the *'urubah* is inferior, a view that has become part of the public convention in the country, and in a projection of this attitude onto those who immigrated from the Arab countries, who are, supposedly, ashamed of their origins. Those affected do indeed reveal some sensitivity to the implications of their origin, but only to the extent that terming them "Arabs" is meant to suggest inferiority or as an intentional hurt. As a matter of fact, the inclination to strengthen the term "Jewish-Arab", that is associated with the name of Albert Memmi (1974), a Tunisian-Jewish sociologist, now a French citizen, is now finding echoes in the public. The Jewish-Arabic literary genre[15], which was common in the Diaspora (particularly in the Babylonian Exile) (cf. Moreh, 1974; 1981) is being renewed in Israel[16]. This genre, with a minority of Jewish[17] and, as it seems, a majority of educated Arab readers, is testimony to the continuation, however latent and silent, of the dialogue with the centers of Arab culture. An author speaks for himself, and, indirectly, with his fellow Arab authors and intellectuals, from whom he was separated physically but not intellectually when he immigrated to Israel.

The expressions of the yearning for *'urubah*, widely found in the Israeli public, are usually passive[18]. There are several reasons for this:

a) The Hebrew language has for some time been in control of the media and the street. Early Ashkenazi immigrants introduced stringent criteria for shaking free of foreign languages. The old-timers were adamant in their determination to cast off European tongues and even consigned their mother tongue, Yiddish, to limbo. Thus they had little compassion for "new immigrants" or for those who were not moved by the vision of the revival of the Hebrew language.

b) Even those who cling to the cultures from which they sprang are aware of the unifying function reserved for the Hebrew language, and of the disruptive effect of a medley of "seventy tongues".

c) The inculcation of the language of the country in children and youth through the state educational institutions, and its transmission through children to parents, is a common process in countries of immigration and in migrant cultures.

d) The attitude to Arabic, which has become the language of enemies and the prime tool for communicating hate propaganda against the Jewish State, Judaism and Jews, has, in many circles, been determined as negative.

e) The backwardness of the Arab peoples, despite the abundant natural resources in many of their countries, is, willy-nilly, attributed to their culture and religion and the obstacles implied therein to the process of modernization. European languages, as well as revived Hebrew, now appear to represent more enlightened cultures. Now that the children of immigrants from the Arab countries are instructed at school and university in these languages, interest in Arabic has begun to decline. It has ceased to be a language for reading and is now used only for domestic conversation.

f) Hebrew now prevails as the *lingua franca*, even in conversations amongst immigrants from Arab countries, since the original cultural context of its speakers, and the dialects of their countries of origin[19], often differ greatly from each other.

Forsaking literary Arabic is less of a crisis than abandonment of spoken Arabic. The former belongs to the intelligentsia[20], the latter to the masses. Adjustment to Hebrew as the language for daily discourse is relatively easy and fast for the traditional intelligentsia, and acquaintance with the language for religious purposes undoubtedly helps. On the other hand, the process of replacing Arabic with Hebrew as a colloquial language is much more composite and lengthy for several reasons:

a) The most useful and common words, such as descriptions of family kinship, names, numbers and measurements, basic foodstuffs and so on, cannot easily be replaced with ornate words that are kept for special occasions[21].

b) Speech patterns are interwoven with thought patterns and any change in the language of speech means a change in conscious and unconscious habits of thinking, a protracted process.

c) Hebrew was revived as an everyday language only in the 20th century and thus was not as deeply-rooted in the inner recesses of the soul as other "mother tongues". Since it was adapted for daily use by philological combinations – some of which were constantly re-adapted because of disputes amongst scholars, others because the public expressed reservations or rejected them – modern Hebrew, for many years, lacked inner-emotional power of persuasion. Until there grew up a group of people among the second generation of immigrants whose mother tongue was Hebrew, the written language was not flexible enough to express the minutiae of emotional nuances.

d) Until such groups of native speakers form among immigrants from various communities, thus adding accuracy and emotional reliability to linguistic uses and serving as an example and object for emulation by their fellows, and so long as the use of the language is synthetic, more of an intellectual exercise, its attraction for those whose intellectual powers are not of the highest will be limited.

e) Arabic, which is firmly entrenched as the language of the Arab street in Israel, maintains its place beside Hebrew so that Arabic-speaking Jews are in no hurry to shake off their mother tongue.

f) Exposure to the emergent "street (or market) culture" also draws Jews of non-"Arabophone" background closer to Arabic.

The subliminal effect of current lingual as well as non-verbal expressions is followed by integration into the Hebrew culture. The extent of the estrangement between European Jewish communities and their surrounding cultural environment was incomparably greater than for the Jewish communities of the Middle East and North Africa (cf. Sharot, 1982: 52-53). The basic cultural proximity between Judaism and Arab Islam helps to mitigate the political cleavage between the peoples and discourages intentional rejection of Arabic – an ambivalence of a similar nature was experienced by many immigrants from Germany towards their native tongue during the 30s-40s.

Though Arabic is decreasingly used for writing, and, subsequently, for conversation, it is still common to listen to the Arabic radio and television broadcasts of the neighboring countries or to Israeli broadcasts in Arabic. Lessening fluency in the language does not detract from the wish to enjoy Arabic-language entertainment programs[22], films and, particularly, music. The more difficult it is to follow serious broadcasts, such as news and comment programs[23], the greater the preference for lighter programs in Arabic. Similar features can be found in other areas of consumption, such as gastronomy, apparel, housing, etc. Despite the exposure to the culture of the West, the tendency is still to prefer household effects, clothing and food with an Arab "flavor". There is a preference for shopping in the market-place and bazaar (which are imprinted with the "Oriental" seal) rather than in the Western "supermarket". The fact that "Oriental" restaurants, coffee-houses, cinemas, and places of entertainment and ways of entertainment are favored, results largely in the exclusion of women from these activities, as in Arab society (cf. Albasel, 1983).

SUI GENERIS HANDICAPS OF THE ACADEMIC APPROACH

In substance, the effects of Arab culture continue to shape attitudes towards means of livelihood, work and leisure patterns, capital and its uses, individual achievements compared with the ascription and kin group's associates' achievements, the personal as against the public domain, sexual relationships, religion, relations between citizen and State, politics, aesthetics and arts, and, in effect, the whole of the social network.

The influence of the *'urubah* is, therefore, stronger and less remote than that of the European cultures. Thus, it is not merely one among many cultures in the Israeli melting-pot, because its specific weight is particularly great. The academic world, however, does not acknowledge its real weight, and there are even those who are inclined to detract from its importance or dismiss it completely[24]. The concluding question is, therefore: Why and whence this reservation? In-depth examination of the structure of the common academic approach suggests several possible answers:

a) Sociological thought, bowing to materialistic logic, minimizes the importance of the cultural factor. Materialism is fashionable in institutions of higher learning in (com-

munist and capitalist) Europe and in America, as well as in Israel. In this spirit, for example, many scholars find it convenient to reject the term "mentality" as though it meant no more than "prejudiced notions", while, ostensibly, we could expect a growing convergence of modern societies (cf. Eisenstadt, 1977).

b) Elimination of cultural content, which is perceived as an incidental "superstructure", is convenient for scientific work since material balances of profit and loss are the simplest explanation for human behavior. The computation of concrete output-input assets is indubitably easier than balancing motivations for action that have their origin in social values or in complex human feelings.

c) Comparative study of artifacts or of customs prevailing in various cultures in parallel institutional spheres may lead, willy nilly, to hierarchical labelling of cultures as enlightened or as inferior, on the basis of their achievements, their contributions to human culture or their latent regeneration potential. On the other hand, comparative research of the physical environment in two different locations places the societies living in each on an equal footing. Any difference between them will be attributed to the advantages or disadvantages inherent in the physical environment and not to the particular culture *sui generis*, since "human nature is much the same the world over", as it were (see Kressel, 1976).

d) Appreciation of "cultural relativity" has been accentuated since the late thirties (Benedict, 1940) in the face of the odious outcome of racist theories which made distorted use of anthropological research. A critique of the "comparative method" approach results, therefore, in the evaluation of each culture as complete in itself (cf. Evan-Prichard, 1963). We are no longer speaking of comparison of artifacts from different locations but (if any comparison at all is conducted), rather of comparison of cultures as wholes, complete in themselves to an identical degree, each quasi-organic system of social institutions balancing the other (cf. Benedict, 1934). They are identical in unique value, equal in value to each other, as a specific hue of the human phenomenon.

e) A mistaken and misleading identification of the genetic factor with cultural expression leads to the faulting of critical examination of the cultural trait, lest it be interpreted as an hereditary blemish. Location of "faults" in national groups can thus involve scholars in charges of "racism".

The desire to respect all cultures, to avoid arrogance and discrimination and to establish the equal value of all men and women as a guiding principle leads to disqualification of research intuition and even to the disallowance of essential information that could be interpreted as a "prejudiced view" or as "racism". This approach now interweaves with the existing trend in the academic world to pragmatic simplicity and with the instinctive socio-political recoil from the search for traditional inhibitions in the individual that are connected to the *'urubah* and which encumber the process of modernization. As a result, current socio-analysis tends to disregard the cultural factor and is hampered in its chance of fathoming the ethnic gap as it unfolds before our very eyes.

FOOTNOTES

[1] As for the term "ethnoclass" which currently prevails in Israel, see Ben-Raphael, 1982; cf. also Smooha and Peres, 1975.

[2] The most natural forum to publicize these views, though lacking in research data, was then *Megamot*, The Behavioral Sciences Quarterly of Israel.

[3] The language of the learned discussion is philosophical - anthropological - psychological and there is no specific identification in it of the groups in question, apart from several illustrative examples, (mainly) the Jews of Yemen and Persia (Iran) and Algeria.

[4] An explicit or latent division of national populations, as of small communities, finds geographical expression (Southerners, Northerners, Easterners, Westerners) on the basis of an ethnic ascription that also takes in the totalities of contradictory or complementary traits (as the Gauls and the Franks in France, the Qays and the Yaman in the Arab world) or traits according to historical religious-political dissension. Divisions of this nature (Sadducees and Pharisees, Sephardis and Ashkenazis, Hassidim and Mithnagdim, the Jews of Eastern Europe [Ostjuden] and Western Europe, 'Iqshim and Darda'im in the Yemen, Kalah Israel and Gorah Israel in Maharashtrah), are still recalled, but have been replaced by new constellations: "religious" and "secular", "Easterners" and "Westerners", "leftists" and "nationalists". The content changes, but the frame remains.

[5] For a discussion of the duality controversy, cf. Kressel (1977) on the kibbutz and Kressel (1982) on blood feuds among urban Bedouin.

[6] For the specificities of Near and Far Eastern Communities in Israel, see: Shiloah, Cohen and Ben-Ami, 1976.

[7] Since the "Spring of the Nations" (1848) and the spread of the "Emancipation".

[8] The writings of the Muslim Reformers of the 19th and early 20th centuries, such as Jalal A-din Al-Afgani, Mahmad Abdu and Rashid M. Rida, who sought to restore Muslim religious thinking as though granting permission for an analysis of sincerity and the lack of applications of the foundations of traditional Muslim thought. The dilution of Muslim culture and the backwardness that was the lot of Islamic countries are related to non-methodical (non-rational) thinking, absence of an ability for abstraction so necessary for the formulation of natural laws. This occurred under the inspiration of fatalism and passivism (particular reference is to the Shi'a and Suffi Movements whose studies focussed on the world-to-come), with the imposition of authoritarianism and doctrinairism, thus suppressing rejuvenating thought, etc. Cf., for example, Gibb, 1945. See also Turner, 1974.

[9] Particularly impressive are the achievements of immigrants from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece.

[10] Descriptions of these peoples, whether as camel-borne merchants travelling the caravan routes (buying Joseph into slavery) or as "locusts" invading the fields with their herds, etc., are frequently negative. See Goitein, 1955. See also Eph'al, 1983.

[11] For the concept of tolerated non-Muslim sects, i.e. the institution of *Ahal Al-Dimma* and the complex deriving from it, see, for example: Hirshberg, 1967. See also Littman, 1975.

[12] There is particularly great sensitivity on the part of Arab scholars *vis-à-vis* strangers researching their heritage. See, for example: Said, 1978 and ez-Zein, 1977.

[13] Regarding the complex of "social distance from the Arabs" which inspires the negative extremism in the declared positions of Oriental Jews *vis-à-vis* Arabs, see Peres, 1976: 91-97.

[14] At study days on "The Ingathering of the Exiles" at the Hebrew University in 1966, the participants and the audience were mainly Ashkenazis (see Antonowski, 1969: 88).

[15] The language of the Baghdadi Jewish street in Arabic script.

[16] On Samir Naqash, the most prominent of those reviving Jewish-Arabic writing in Israel, see Piamenta, 1981.

[17] Jewish communities in Arab countries have been depleted; the Jews who remain are few in

number and their hold on their spiritual heritage is weak. Arabic readers amongst the intermediate generation of those who immigrated from Arab countries to Israel are few and becoming less as the younger generation no longer knows any Arabic.

[18] Forceful expression of the yearning for the Arab culture was given by the play "Criza" (Crisis) at the Haifa Theatre in 1977. It is also reflected in the widespread popularity of the "cassette singers", mostly second-generation immigrants from Arab countries, who sing Hebrew couplets to Arab-style melodies.

[19] The Moroccan, Yemenite and Iraqi dialects of daily speech, for example, differ greatly from one another.

[20] In most Jewish communities abroad, prior to modern times, the majority did not learn to read the local language; women did not learn at all. See, for example: Deshen and Zenner, 1982: 12-13.

[21] Underlying the glottochronological system is the assumption that the most useable words best resist change. See: Morris Swadesh, 1952.

[22] A custom that has spread of late is watching Arabic entertainment programs on video, such as "The Moroccan Arab Feast". Some even show it on Seder Night, after the reading of the Haggadah.

[23] General surveys that I conducted in Hatzor ha-Gelilit (1976), Ramla (1978) and in Ashkelon (1980) show that the language in which the news is broadcast and the speed of delivery make it difficult for the message to be absorbed. Many people, and not only the adults of the intermediate generation, prefer to watch entertainment programs broadcast from Jordan when Israel Television is showing the news and news commentary programs.

[24] As an example of "color-blindness" or methodical disregard in order not to discern the cultural component in the community gap, see, for example: Swirski, 1981.

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