INTER-BUREAUCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ISRAEL: THE CASE OF PLANNING POST-PEACE MILITARY REDEPLOYMENT

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The redeployment of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Negev region was one of the major domestic outcomes of the 1978 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. There, the military and civilian bureaucracies were faced with the challenge of redeploying the army in a way which would minimize damage to civilian objectives in the area, on the one hand, and yield maximum benefits, on the other. Their failure to adequately meet this challenge can be attributed to the nature of civil-military relations in Israel at the bureaucratic level. These relations do not conform to the pattern of the "nation-in-arms" commonly attributed to Israel in the literature. Their parameters, namely the nature of the boundaries between the civilian and military and the relative institutional strengths of these establishments, suggest that an alternative model may be more useful in answering the question: why did very little development occur in the civilian sector while most of the objectives of the military redeployment were met?

INTRODUCTION

The behavior and power of the military as a bureaucracy should concern any modern democratic state. The realities of democratic politics have required the "specialists of violence" to enter and continuously fight inter-bureaucratic wars. Such "paper wars" occur within the more general context of national politics. In the routine process of determining "who gets what, when, how" in the Welfare State, the military is one participant among many. It plays the role of a bureaucracy working to influence the development of public policy in accordance with its needs and views. The use of bureaucratic resources, aside from being the more legitimate way to obtain political power, can, on numerous occasions, be a good substitute for the use of physical force. Moreover, the bureaucratic method can give the armed forces certain powers which coercion would have not achieved.

In competitive policy-making, bureaucratic power can be exercised at various stages of the process. The relative powers of the competitors influence agenda-setting, problem formulation, examination of alternatives, choice of policy, implementation, evaluation and feed-back. The concern here is with the bureaucratic resources of the military and the way they were used to influence policy making. As was noted by Luckham (1971:20), most studies on civil-military relations focus on military

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intervention by force in the management of the state. I share his conviction that "the trouble with studies that take military intervention as such as their main dependent variable is that they are looking only at the tip of an iceberg and questions of the covert role the army may be playing in politics tend to be left aside." The use of bureaucratic means by the military to shape policy decisions as demonstrated in Israel of the 1980's forms the focus of this study.

Comparative typologies of civil-military relations have labeled Israel as a most typical "nation-in-arms." Rapaport (1963:77) defined a "nation-in-arms" as a nation which uses military training as the chief civic bond. He argued that "without universal military service Israel would probably find it impossible to achieve a minimum standard of citizenship for individuals from forty diverse lands who outnumber the native "Sabra" by almost two-and-a-half to one." He observed, along with others (Halperin, 1962:347; Glick, 1967; Hurewitz, 1974; Janowitz, 1964:77; Ben-Dor, 1973; Perlmutter, 1969:Ch.4; 1978), that the Israeli army has spent a great deal of its resources on providing basic education to recruits (including the teaching of the Hebrew language), as well as military skills. During the days of mass-immigration, for example, it helped build and manage temporary housing camps for the new immigrants. Women soldiers were assigned as teachers in the camps and outlying areas. Therefore, a broader definition, such as the one offered by Luckham (1971:24), might have better fitted the Israeli case, namely: a nation where "full-time military is small and reliance tends to be placed on conscription and citizen reserves" and where "the armed forces are integrated into civilian pursuits and purposes."

According to the latter definition, should the "nation-in-arms" model apply to the Israeli reality on the bureaucratic level, one would anticipate the civilian and military bureaucracies to be well-coordinated in the pursuit of mutual goals. The planning of military redeployment in Israel following the signing of the Camp David agreements can help examine whether this is the case in Israel of the 1980's.

The withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Sinai Penninsula, aside from its strategic and economic significance, is probably the most important domestic consequence of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Within three years of the signing, a massive redeployment of forces had to take place. The bulk of these forces relocated in what became once again the southern-most region of Israel, the Negev desert.

As a result of this redeployment in the Negev, the Israeli government faced a double challenge. From a military point of view, the IDF had to find strategically viable substitutes for the positions and facilities it left behind. These had to be "squeezed" into an area which is about six times smaller than the 37,500 square miles of the Sinai desert being evacuated. Moreover, unlike the Sinai desert which, since its occupation by Israel in 1967, served practically for exclusive military use, much of the area of the Negev is used for a variety of civilian purposes: urban, rural and nomadic living, agriculture, industry (especially of the land-intensive kind), recreation, as well as tourism. Therefore, from a civilian point of view, the negative effects of the military redeployment had to be minimized and mutual benefits maximized.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the difficulties experienced by the civil and military branches of the Israeli government in coping with the challenge of planning and developing the Negev in a way which best served the overall national interest. It is suggested that the evident failure to adequately coordinate the planning and development of the Negev stems primarily from the civil-military relationship at the bureaucratic level. This failure occurred although both the military and the civil

authorities acknowledged the importance of such cooperation. Mostly at the initiative of the military, measures were taken to facilitate such coordination. Nevertheless, the relative superiority of the military as a bureaucracy has resulted in its dominance in planning and developing the Negev in the wake of the peace agreements with Egypt. The military bureaucracy, compared to the civilian, demonstrated a superior capacity to define goals, and to mobilize the political and administrative resources as well as the support needed to implement them.

The scope and dimensions of the development of the Negev following the peace agreement with Egypt are presented in the first part of this paper. The crowding of the region as a result of the addition of military uses to the many civilian uses of the Negev is discussed there. The response of the authorities and the public to this problem of dividing the Negev among the various civilian and military users is presented in the subsequent part. Then, the attempt of the civilian and military bureaucracies to cope with the challenge of planning and developing the Negev in a coordinated and balanced way is presented. The failure of this attempt is discussed in the succeeding parts. The superiority of the military planners, both by virtue of the legal arrangements guiding regional zoning and the organizational resources available to them, is held responsible for the failure documented in the last part.

THE CROWDING OF THE NEGEV

The IDF redeployment in the Negev radically altered perspectives on the development of this region. Since the establishment of the State in 1948 until the present time, the Negev has been the main civilian frontier of Israel. These six thousand square miles of desert land, which are about two thirds of Israeli territory within its international borders, have attracted many dreamers and entrepreneurs. The development of this southern-most region of Israel has been one of the most cherished goals of the State.

The 1960's were a turning point in the development of the Negev. Investment in the area and migration to the region decreased compared to the figures of the 1950's (Shachar, 1977). The retirement from power of the first Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, who had devoted much of his energy while in office to this cause, largely influenced the devaluation of the development of the Negev among other national priorities. The results of the 1967 Six Day War reinforced this trend. The bulk of the military forces stationed in the Negev was moved to the Sinai, which was occupied by Israel during that war. That move meant not only the immediate loss of population and military spending, but more significantly, the loss of massive investments in military infrastructure which were diverted to the Sinai from the Negev in the fifteen years up to 1982. It should be emphasized that, until 1967, the IDF was actively involved in promoting and facilitating civilian development in the Negev. After 1967, most of the Negev was dedicated to civilian development projects, with the army retaining a minimal number of bases and forces in the region. The need to withdraw from the Sinai sharply changed that reality. Practically overnight, what were considered the "endless land reserves of the Negev" became overly-crowded.

The necessity of the army having to relocate to the Negev has forced it to contend with civilian concerns in the region. Although not much had changed physically in the fifteen years of the IDF's absence, ambitious civilian plans drawn up and approved in the regional masterplan (Shachar, 1977) had to be taken into consideration. In addition, civilian development needed or facilitated by the military build-up had to be contemplated. Among the civilian concerns, the following have been outstanding:

(a) Civilian population: it includes over a quarter of a million people. In close proximity to the main areas of deployment (the southern Negev) there are six towns, dozens of existing or planned kibbutzim or moshavim (forms of cooperative settlements), as well as villages and encampments inhabited by about 40,000 Bedouins.

(b) Industry: it employs 22.7% of the work force in the Negev (Tahal, 1980:47), as well as claiming large areas. In particular, the Negev, as the least populated region, has been zoned as the home of land-intensive, dangerous and polluting industries.

(c) Agriculture: this is partly extensive and partly intensive. The former is based on sowing grain on vast fields of about 891,000 dunams partially irrigated while gambling on a rainy year. The latter is based on hot-houses capitalizing on the sunny climate of the region.

(d) Nature reserves and national parks: these cover about a third of the Negev's land. The retention of the natural qualities of the desert landscape and life as well as their value for recreation and touring are the main goals of these land allocations.

(e) Archeological sites: these are a silent testimony to thousands of years of desert living. The continued preservation of such sites for their own sake as well as for their scientific and tourist value is an important consideration in determining the future of the area.

(f) Infrastructural elements: they include airports, roads, telecommunication networks, electrical power stations and lines which are necessary to serve local as well as national needs.

In spite of its civilian uses, only the Negev could accommodate the bulk of the withdrawing army. What aggravated the problem even further was the fact that the forces, equipment and facilities which had to be relocated were far larger than what was originally moved out of the Negev in 1967. Although the exact figures are secret, general information on the growth of the IDF can provide an idea of the magnitude. According to the reports of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the military expenditures of Israel in 1966 amounted to 282 million dollars, which were 10.9% of the GNP. In 1973, following the Yom Kippur War, the military expenditure jumped to 3.74 billion dollars, which were 38% of the GNP. This level of about 4 billion dollars, more or less, has been kept up to the present time. A quarter to a third of the military expenditure was spent on armaments. The IDF, which in 1967 numbered less than 100,000 soldiers, almost doubled by the end of the seventies (USACDA, 1978; 1980).

BALANCED CIVIL-MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

Initially, the scope and magnitude of the issues surrounding regional development in the Negev following the peace agreement with Egypt elicited much public concern. It was widely recognized that something beyond re-zoning of the Negev for military use was necessary. The public record in the months after Camp David is full of statements in favor of integrated civil-military planning and development of the region. The President of Israel, Yitzhak Navon, voiced his concern on several occasions that the entire region would turn into one vast military base. Prominent politicians living in and outside of the Negev warned against allowing the military to take over the entire region. A motion in the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, called on both civilian and military authorities to carefully plan and execute what was characterized "the largest public enterprise in Israel ever." Similar statements were made in abundance in the electronic and written mass media, as well as in numerous open and public forums. A great deal of optimism was

evident in many of these statements. It blended well with the general spirit of euphoria in Israel in the initial period after peace with Egypt was achieved.

Within two months after the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt, the IDF presented its masterplan for the redeployment, which was in tune with the general public sentiment. The plan was included in two reports: one report entitled: "A Plan to Develop the Negev--Deployment and Infrastructure" (Tahal, 1979). The other report was entitled: "IDF Deployment--Infrastructure Needs" (Ministry of Defense, Planning Division, 1979). Both reports emphasized the need for a comprehensive civil and military approach to the development of the region, given the new circumstances.

The first report stated that the Negev is the main land reserve left for future development in Israel. Given its unique natural resources, its potential for agriculture, tourism, mining, and its already existing structures, the report cited the preparation of an overall national plan "of an unprecedented scope" to develop the Negev as an absolute must. It called for a "special and responsible approach" in determining where and how to deploy the army. The objective of such a plan should be "to use the deployment of the IDF as a lever and a catalyst for regional and local development processess in the Negev, with the recognition that IDF deployment by itself will not bring about the blooming of the Negev" (Tahal, 1979: Introduction).

The accompanying military plan emphasized the need for a balance between the needs of the army and those stemming from the various civilian objectives. The main considerations were: securing strategic and operational capabilities, providing facilities for integrated exercises, avoidance of excessive take-over of territory which has alternative (civilian) uses, maximum feasible integration between military installations and civilian development, while utilizing civilian installations, and safeguarding environmental quality. The plan emphasized its compliance with the Negev zoning masterplan prepared in November, 1977 (Shachar, 1977). The plans for military development have mostly focused on the areas not designated for civilian development. Moreover, the more general "Plan to Develop the Negev--Deployment and Infrastructure" (Tahal, 1979) identified areas in which conflict already existed between the needs of the military and those of the civilian sector. The plan listed areas of military use, such as drill areas, airfields or other installations, which could not coexist with areas designated for other uses, such as urban living, agriculture, industry, nature reserves, archeological sites and other tourist attractions. The plan also noted the potential benefits to civilian objectives in the region stemming from the massive military investment.

To facilitate a coordinated and significant civilian input into the planning of the Negev, a high-level governmental committee was created. Prodded by their own conviction of the national significance of the matter, the Deputy Minister of Defense, Mordechai Tzipori, and the Deputy Minister of Finance, Yehezkel Floumin, agreed on September 26, 1978 (9 days after the Camp David accord was signed), with the Cabinet's blessing (April 8, 1978) to create an inter-agency committee. The committee included the directors-general of the following ministries: Defense, Treasury, Interior, Construction and Housing, Labor and Welfare, Infrastructure and Energy, Communications, Transportation, Industry, Commerce and Tourism, Education and Culture, Justice, Agriculture and a representative of the Deputy Prime Minister. It should be noted that the idea to create a 'TVA type' agency to handle the development of the Negev (see Gradus and Stern, 1980) was rejected due to the reluctance of government ministries to delegate authority.

It should be emphasized that the coordination of the post-peace planning and

development of the Negev was delegated to the bureaucratic level. The magnitude and significance of the project did not attract involvement at the ministerial level. Indicative was the fact that while for two years continuous attempts were made to insert the matter into the Cabinet's agenda in its regular weekly session, it was pushed aside by other topics. At the time, the Cabinet was preoccupied with issues surrounding the peace process, the future of the occupied territories and the soaring inflation. The matters concerning redeployment in the Negev had neither the crisis qualities nor the political flair of those issues dominating the political agenda. The relevant ministerial committee expediently delegated them to the Directors-General Committee. This might have been read by both military and civilian parties as a signal of the weakness of governmental commitment to integrated planning of the Negev. The decision, actually the indecision, of the Cabinet dictated a situation in which decision-making concerning the redeployment would take place within an institutional setting where the relative powers of the various bureaucracies would count.

CIVIL AND MILITARY BUREAUCRACIES ATTEMPT COORDINATION

The Directors-General Committee was divided into seven systemic subcommittees: water; energy; communications; ground transportation; industry; minerals and tourism; construction; and manpower regulation. These forums were to work out the general guidelines for planning and developing the Negev in their areas. The conclusions and recommendations of the subcommittees had to filter their way back up to the Directors-General Committee for its approval. A "limited forum," comprised of the Directors-General of Interior (Chairman), Finance, Agriculture, Construction and Housing, as well as the assistant Defense Minister for National Security was to decide on the implementation of the guidelines set by the Directors-General Committee. This "limited forum" was to handle conflicts between alternative uses of Negev resources, mainly land. Its decisions were then to guide the statutory zoning commission in determining actual land use, according to the *Planning and Construction Law of 1965* . A Committee to coordinate the planning was created under the "limited forum." This Committee included officials appointed by the various members of the "limited forum" to specifically deal with this subject-matter.

The Directors-General Committee was formally to report to the Cabinet Committee for Economic Affairs. For most practical purposes, the Directors-General Committee, chaired by its founders, was the highest authority determining the future of the Negev. The founders of the committee, Tzipori and Floumin, saw it as a major vehicle for integrated planning of the Negev. They believed that, through the involvement of the various ministries, balanced planning would be accomplished.

The professional staff of the Directors-General Committee was known as the "Team for Integrated Planning." The Team's creation preceded that of the Directors-General Committee. Its original leadership included a professor of urban planning, a senior partner in an architectural firm, the head of a planning unit in a large consulting firm, an expert on Bedouins and agricultural settlements, and the head of a transportation planning and consulting firm. The Team for Integrated Planning was formed upon the signing of the peace agreements with Egypt at the initiative of its members. The members were united in the feeling that redeployment in the Negev was an extraordinary event. Such an event, they believed, could not be handled by the existing governmental machinery. That machinery they judged to be too diffuse and rigid to come up with the necessary plans. Key figures in the establishment, such as the IDF Chief of Staff, Director-General of the Treasury and the Water Commissioner

supported the idea. Yet, the Team ran into difficulites in finding sponsors for its activities. The Director-General of the Interior refused to hire its services. The Ministry of Agriculture, due to the personal conviction of one of its top officials, became the Team's original sponsor, although it worked most closely with the military planners. Upon the creation of the Directors-General Committee, the Team for Integrated Planning was assigned to provide staff services for it. Initially, their main task was writing up the committee's basic working paper: "Plan to Develop the Negev-Development and Infrastructure." Shortly after the publication of the report in May 1979, the Team was reassigned. The "limited forum" accepted the Team as its staff. It was to work most closely with the Committee to coordinate the planning headed by a high-ranking Interior Ministry official. To summarize, institutional measures were taken to facilitate integrated planning of the Negev, including the creation of coordinating committees and the provision of staff servcices for them.

The quality of the Directors-General Committee's decision-making process as well as its ability to enforce its decisions was up to the various members. Typically for a coordinating committee, it could have forced the participants neither to cooperate nor to comply with the committee and its decisions. Politically, the work of the Committee could go in different directions. It could have affected unified action on the part of the various civilian bureaucracies involved. It could have served as a clearing-house for programs resulting in various degrees of coordination. Members could also use it as a stage to voice and defend their opinions and positions. On the other hand, the Committee could have effectively been ignored by the members. In fact, processes within and outside the Committee, affected by the political strengths and weaknesses of the various participants, have shaped its real nature. The eventual failure of the Directors-General Committee to meet some of its major objectives has testified to the formal and political weaknesses of the civilian sector relative to the military.

FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS OF THE MILITARY

Even if the Directors-General Committee had completely failed to live up to its mission, redeployment in the Negev could take place. Formally, the redeployment could be carried out with minimal involvement of civilian bodies. On the most elementary level, the redeployment meant the zoning of certain areas for military use. *The Planning and Construction Law of 1965* exempts zoning for military purposes from most procedural requirements placed on civilian zoning. Any civilian zoning request has to be submitted to a local council, can be appealed to a district council and further appealed to a national council. The local council is usually identified with the elected council of the township or municipality. Its decisions are bound by the guidelines set by the District Council. The District Council includes fifteen members representing most governmental agencies in the district, as well as public representatives and professional planners. The entire process is subject to public scrutiny. The sessions of the local and district councils are open to the public. All plans must be deposited for two months of public inspection. By contrast, the process of zoning of security installations is shorter and secretive with limited civilian participation.

A subcommittee on security installations of the District Council has the formal power to approve or reject zoning requests of the military. The subcommittee has three members only: two appointed by the Minister of Interior with the approval of the Minister of Defense and one by the latter as his representative. For the period under consideration, the subcommittee on Security Installations of the Southern district (which includes the Negev) was made up of the District Director for the Ministry of

Interior, the District Director of the Israel Lands Administration and the head of the Planning Branch of the IDF General Command. The subcommittee on Security Installations holds its meetings in executive sessions. It may invite concerned or expert witnesses at its own discretion. Plans for security installations do not have to be deposited for examination by affected groups or any other parties. The subcommittee is authorized to notify affected parties of the potential impact the plans may have on their property or concerns and they can present their reservations, within ten days. If the subcommittee rejects the reservations they have to be reported to the Committee for Security Installations of the National Council of Planning and Construction. The latter committee, numbering either three or five members has the final authority to either approve or reject the reservations within 15 days.

The law, as it stands, does not create much of a framework for integrated civil-military planning at either the regional or national level. The extent of civilian input is at the discretion of the two civilian members of the subcommittee. It is up to them whether to require a pre-examination of the plans before they are brought to the committee for consideration or to approve them on the spot. They can involve others in advising them on the matter, if permission of the Minister of Defense is granted. They can rely on their own judgment exclusively. The two civilian members of the subcommittee bear the responsibility for assigning proper weight to all non-military repercussions of a given land-use by the military. They can, however, function as a "rubber stamp" for military zoning plans and still adhere to the letter of the law. Actually, since one of the members is always the party proposing the plan, only a vote of one of the civilians is needed to carry the decision. In other words, the law allows one non-elected civilian official to determine on his own the zoning for security purposes of an entire region. If the district ruling is appealed, the approval of two other civilians is needed to decide whether to approve a military zoning plan.

SUPERIOR PLANNING CAPABILITY OF THE IDF

The procedural advantages of the military planner over the civilian counterpart are accompanied by superior administrative capability. The preparation of military plans for land use could be carried out without the technical or other assistance of any civilian body. The military has its own planning outfit. A Branch of Planning has existed in the IDF General Headquarters since 1974, headed by a senior General who reports directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff. The Planning Branch serves as the central clearing house and coordinating body of military planning. To this Branch, plans of the specialized forces and the district commands are channeled. It is also within this Branch that the overall plans are made and are submitted to the High Command for approval.

The Planning Branch and the various specialized and district units have full-time planners on their staffs. When necessary, they contract out to civilian professional planners. Moreover, many civilian planners do their reserve duty in the various planning units of the IDF. When needed, they can be called up to perform professional work for the army as part of their military obligations. To sum up, the military is largely self-sufficient in terms of its technical capacity to plan. These types of manpower resources were actually mobilized in the planning of redeployment in the Negev.

In the case of planning military redeployment in the Negev, although civilian bodies might have had information which could be of help to the military planners, there was no routine institutional mechanism to transfer such information to the military. The types of information which might have been requested by the military planners or transferred to them by civilian agencies, unlike the military, on such matters as urban, industrial,

recreational or environmental planning, largely depended on local initiative and informal processes. For the most part, it was up to the military planner to ask for certain types of information if he thought it important to his plan. For example, a climatologist or an environmentalist might have had useful information to be considered in the choice of location and design of a military base. If, on the other hand, the military planner was not aware of the potential contribution of these experts and they, on the other hand, even if they had known what he was doing, did not have informal access to him, such a contribution was not made. Furthermore, even if a member of the District Subcommittee on Military Installations was aware of the potential contribution and asked for it, it might have been too late. The choice was then between accepting the plan as submitted or starting the planning process all over again. The latter choice could, by then, have been too complicated or costly to be practical. Such was the case with planning the military airfield of Nevatim. When it was discovered that the planned landing and take-off pattern would cause noise pollution in Arad it was too late and too costly to change.[1]

Given the procedure which the military planners have to follow, as well as their administrative resources and capacity, the civilian planners typically have several disadvantages. First, as outlined above, the civilian planners have to follow a much longer, costlier and complicated zoning procedure than their military counterparts. Second, civilian planning is typically more fragmented than military planning. Basically, the process is pluralistic in both sectors. The military is made up of numerous specialized and geographically distributed units. Each of these units has its needs and perspectives which it attempts to translate into plans. Moreover, the IDF is a part of the Defense Ministry which also includes numerous departments, agencies, industries and other organizations. Similarly, the civilian sector is made up of about fifteen ministries and dozens of national, regional, and local agencies, authorities, corporations, etc. Still, the crucial difference is in the unity at the top and the ways in which decisions flow. Typically, the unity of command is much more emphasized and effective in the military than in the civilian sector. It is all the more so in Israel. In Israel's parliamentary system, the Cabinet is made up of a coalition of several parties and the parties themselves usually are coalitions of several groups. Consequently, each minister tends to be politically independent of his colleagues. The role of the Prime Minister is more that of a mediator than the civilian equivalent of the authoritative Chief of Staff or even the Minister of Defense. Third, in terms of manpower the civilian body is typically at a disadvantage. The military budget is larger than the civilian budgets put together, and the military can more easily assign people to contract it out. Fourth, in the civilian sector, compared to the military, there is less recognition of the importance of planning. Within certain sectors, planning is more acceptable, such as the infrastructural agencies and agriculture (Akzin and Dror, 1965; Bilski et al., 1980). Fifth, the civilian agencies cannot raise their capacity by calling people up for service.

These institutional disadvantages of the civilian planners vis-a-vis their military counterparts, prevented them from being effective partners in integrated planning. Some major institutional changes could improve the chances for integrated planning. A Cabinet decision on the matter could perhaps have made a difference. One of the proposals circulated at the time was to create a "Negev Development Authority" which would control civilian and military planning and development in the region. This idea failed to gather support among the various ministries which were not willing to submit their powers to such an authority. Subsequently, the idea was dropped. Obviously, the verbal commitments to integrated planning were not translated into meaningful formal institutional or budgetary measures to give it a better chance of success.

WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED

The success of the Directors-General Committee in affecting integrated planning of the Negev was limited to certain areas. Some of its subcommittees have produced what was expected of them. A plan to supply the water needs of the civilian and military sector was prepared. The communication needs of both sectors were translated into an integrated masterplan. The case was the same in the areas of transportation and energy.

The success of the Directors-General Committee and the entire civilian bureaucracy in effectively responding to the challenges emanating from the need for massive redeployment was evaluated in the 1980 Annual Report of the State Comptroller. The Report raises six points of criticism which emphasize how bureaucratic processes have undermined attempts for integrated planning in the Negev.

First, the Directors-General Committee was delayed in starting its work. Although the Committee was officially created in September 1978, its exact structure and responsibilities were not determined until some six months later and even after that it took another month, until April, 1979, for the Cabinet to approve it. The main impediments to constructing the committee were the misgivings of the Interior Ministry. The Director-General of the Interior felt the Committee was impinging on his statutory jurisdiction. By law, his Ministry is responsible for physical planning. It was only after another six months that a compromise was worked out between a position favoring a multi-ministerial planning process and that espousing the ultimate control of a single ministry, the Ministry of Interior. One of the results of the delay in starting the work of the Directors-General Committee was that it had two military-sponsored reports on hand once it got going.

The State Comptroller's second finding was that the Committee's machinery deteriorated to such an extent that functioning became a problem. As of January 1, 1980, the Committee had met for a total of sixteen work sessions. In the beginning it was convened every three or four weeks, the Report notes, and after July, 1979, every four or five weeks. Even during the early days of the Committee, only four or five of the eleven Directors-General attended the meetings. Officials of lower rank usually represented the absent Directors-General. After May 1979, attendance dropped drastically to about one to three of the Directors-General.

The third finding was that most of the civilian ministries could not cope well with the deadlines set by the military planners. In general, the response of the civilian ministries to plans or internal memos initiated by Defense was tardy, if at all existent. For example, shortly after the appointment of the Directors-General Committee, the Ministry of Defense circulated a preliminary plan for military infrastructure in the Negev. Ten ministries were asked to comment within ten days, given the strict timetable dictated by the peace agreement negotiations. Only three ministries responded on time. One ministry took 52 days to reply. But at least that ministry replied, unlike six of the ten ministries contacted.

Yet, this deadline problem was not only the fault of the ministries that were contacted. The Report stated as a fourth finding that the Ministry of Defense set deadlines, paying little attention to the ability of the other ministries to cope with them either efficiently or effectively. For example, a detailed plan of roads was ordered with the stipulation of a 30-day deadline, before the relevant subcommittee had a chance to formulate its recommendations. As a result, large sums of money were spent on planning roads which were later judged unnecessary.

Another finding of the Report was that a subcommittee to coordinate and direct the implementation of the decisions of the Directors-General Committee was never established. This was in spite of the fact that it was agreed to create such a body from the very beginning.

The Report's sixth and final finding was that a subcommittee to coordinate urban development was also never established. Several ministries undertook uncoordinated and, at times, overlapping efforts to improve conditions in the development towns of the Negev. For example three different ministries (Construction and Housing; Industry, Commerce and Tourism; and Interior) each hired a private firm to plan the development of the town of Eilat.

Following the critical description of the work of the Directors-General Committee, the State Comptroller proceeded to spell out the main shortcomings of civilian development in the Negev vis-a-vis the redeployment of the military:

1. The planning of most projects recognized as the immediate needs of the military deployment process received budgetary allocations; projects of civilian development, on the other hand, although of recognized importance, were for the most part neither planned nor included in budgeting. Such civilian projects included road construction and reconstruction; planning and financing the development of services and physical infrastructure in development towns; creating new jobs, establishing new agricultural settlements, etc.

2. Civilian planning did not always keep pace with military planning. This gap might have resulted in either faulty planning or in the creation of shortages or surpluses in housing, educational facilities, welfare and health services, as well as elementary local services.

3. Planning and execution of municipal development in the towns of the Negev was divided among too many ministries.

4. While resources were invested in the preparation of general plans and guidelines for development, detailed planning of towns and areas lagged behind.

5. Too few attempts were made to involve Negev residents or their representatives in planning their towns and region, or inform them about those plans.

6. The various ministries planning and developing Negev towns, did not have a mutual forecast of population growth on which to base their decision-making.

The State Comptroller's findings were based on a detailed review of the documents related to the Directors-General Committee. The findings were not refuted by various participants in the Committee. Essentially, the Committee was not instrumental in creating results beyond certain processes of give and take. It did not yield the integrated plan which took into consideration not only actual conflicts but non-zero sum relationships as well.

The State Comptroller's follow-up report of 1981 maintained that the problems pointed out in the 1980 report quoted above have not substantively changed. While military planning was virtually complete and was intensively carried out, civilian projects were lagging behind, including urban planning, housing construction and school construction.

The second report of the Team for Integrated Planning, *Plan for Development of the Negev - Deployment and Infrastructure*, published towards the end of 1980 (Tahal, 1980), also pointed out the failure of integrated planning in certain areas which caused either

unresolved conflict or difficulties in yielding benefits to civilian objectives: First, proper sites for civilian airports in the Negev could not be easily identified. Second, for reasons of safety and secrecy a civilian air-corridor linking the Southern Negev with the North could not be outlined. Third, there was no significant move of military personnel to the Negev with their families. Fourth, there was no serious effort to move the production and supply of services for the IDF to the Negev. Fifth, masterplans for the supply of water, electricity and communications were approved by the District Committee on Military Installations but the report doubts whether they were comprehensive enough. Sixth, the army agreed to purchase 950 housing units for its personnel in the development towns of the Negev. Yet, as the report pointed out, the necessary budgeting arrangements and questions of location, size and quality had not yet been worked out.

The IDF largely completed its redeployment in the Negev by the target date of April 1982. By contrast, relatively little had changed in the civilian sector in the area. The failure of the two sectors to cooperate in an integrated comprehensive plan to develop the Negev was largely responsible for this state of affairs.

CONCLUSION

Military redeployment in the Negev set into motion a process in which the needs of the military and the civilian sectors had to be either explicitly or implicitly determined. The account and analysis of the way these conflicts were negotiated and resolved paints a picture of current civil-military relations in Israel, especially in the bureaucratic domain. It illuminates the obstacles and disincentives which hamper cooperation between the two sectors in regional development. In this domain, at least, the outcomes do not conform to the model of "nation-in-arms" as defined above. That is, there was no integration of the military into civilian pursuits and purposes.

Apparently, the failure to coordinate was not the result of intentional behavior. The military was willing to share its plans and work together with the civilian authorities, to a large extent. The institutional conditions needed for a "nation-in-arms" did not exist. Luckham used two sets of variables to classify civil-military relations: a) the nature of boundaries between the military establishment and its socio-political environment; b) the relative strengths of the civilian and military establishments.

In a "nation-in-arms" the boundaries between the military and civilian establishments are typically fragmented. "Boundaries are fragmented to the extent that in a military establishment with distinctive military format and goals, the interactions of holders of military roles with holders of civilian roles escape the control of the military elite in a way that impairs its freedom to interact with the political and social environment as a single entity in a consistent manner" (Luckham, 1971:18). In other words, civil-military interactions occur at all levels and are not the prerogative of the top command. By and large, such fragmentation was not evident in the planning of the redeployment. Most of the decisions were made using the proper formal channels with a negligible proportion of the problems worked out using informal or local relationships.

As for relative institutional strengths, three "massive political advantages" of the armed forces over civilian organizations were listed by Samuel Finer: a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized status and a monopoly of arms. In Finer's analysis, the organizational strength of the army stems from its main objective to fight and win wars.Its organizational features are: (1) centralized command, (2) hierarchy, (3) discipline, (4) intercommunication and (5) *esprit de corps* and a

corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency (Finer, 1962). These features are accepted as the rational means to serve an army's main purpose. Yet an important by-product of them is the improved capacity to successfully contend with civilian bureaucracies. As was pointed out by Janowitz (1964), especially in new nations, the organizational strengths of the military are emphasized. The policy outcomes in the case presented above were largely influenced by the relative organizational strengths of the military. These were reflected in its superior ability to mobilize the necessary resources to affect the planning process. This conclusion should be qualified though, as it cannot be ascertained what would have happened had the Cabinet demonstrated a stronger commitment to integrated planning.

The hopes of an integrated plan for the Negev could have been better realized, perhaps, had civil-military relations in the bureaucratic domain in Israel conformed to the "nation-in-arms" model. Then, the plans might have been made in a more effective joint process. These findings may be carried a step further to suggest, as was done before on the basis of a different set of variables (Ben-Dor, 1977), that the model of a "nation-in-arms" is generally outdated in the case of Israel. In the Fifties, Israel might have conformed to that model, as the State emerged after years of fighting for independence. Social and political processes in effect ever since might have created a different reality, that of the "garrison state" (Horowitz, 1977). That is the state where the military has integral boundaries and the power of military institutions is high and also exceeds that of civilian institutions (Luckham, 1971:26). To substantiate that, of course, a much broader study is required.

FOOTNOTE

1. Interviews with Mordechai Tzipori and Yitzhak Vardimon.

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