# POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND COALITION SIZE: THE CASE OF ISRAEL'S RULING PARTY

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*On the basis of the deductive theories of political coalitions in a modified form, a comparison is drawn between three types of coalitions that have been formed over the years in Israel: minimal, oversized and grand coalitions. From this comparison it is concluded that as regards size, the present Likud-led minimal winning coalition that was formed after the October 1981 elections, has more space to maneuver on policy matter than governments that rest on other possible size configurations. Israel's policy position has been less dependent on coalitionary politics than on the personal stands and aspirations of its leaders.*

## INTRODUCTION

The somewhat surprising 'come from behind' plurality victory of the Likud party over the Labor party in the election of October 1981, necessitated the formation of a coalitionary government. While coalition government is common in Israel, the small base of parliamentary support (61 seats out of 120 Knesset members), consistently raises doubts concerning the future ability of the government to successfully execute major policies. More specifically, will the Israeli government be able to survive major decisions such as military deployment in Lebanon, or the provision of autonomy to the Arab population of the West Bank of the Jordan.

The purpose of this article is to explain the constraints set on the Israeli policy position, through concentrating on one independent variable, the size configuration of the governing coalition. On the basis of the deductive theories of political coalitions, a comparison is drawn between three types of coalitions: minimal, oversized and grand coalition. From this comparison it is concluded that as regards size, the present Likud-led minimal winning coalition that was formed after the October 1981 elections, has more space to maneuver on policy matters than other possible size configurations. Israel's policy position is less dependent on coalitionary politics than on the personal stands and aspirations of its leaders.

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*Political Coalitions – The Deductive Approach*

On the basis of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's seminal work, *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1947), William Riker (1962) developed an elaborated game theoretical approach to coalition formation. The pillar of his theory of political coalition is the concept of size principle, whereby under assumption of individual rationality and perfect information, in the context of n-persons zero sum games with side payments, players will always form minimal winning coalitions (Riker, 1962:32).

Thus, if S denotes the size of a given coalition and V(S) defines its value in terms of the share each member can secure by being included in such a coalition, then, $V(S) > V(S+i)$, where i is an additional member of S. This is because the n members of S must pay a fraction, $\alpha$, of their share to i, the extra member. It follows that members of S, in order to maximize their gains, must minimize the size of the coalition by excluding all the i's who do not contribute directly to winning. Hence, a minimal winning coalition (MWC) carries the highest value for its members. Moreover, when size is minimal, exclusion of any i member of S may turn a winning coalition into a losing one. Therefore, small size itself may be sufficient inducement for the coalition members to continue maintaining their value. In zero sum situations losing is not attractive.

The assumptions in Riker's deductive theory, such as the perfect information or the zero sum conditions are rarely, if ever, met in real life. Consequently, he had to translate the game theoretical principle into a descriptive, sociological law as follows: In social situations similar to n-persons, zero sum games, with side payments, participants create coalitions just large enough, so they believe, to ensure winning, and no larger (Riker, 1962:32-33).

Application of the above principle to actual situations yields varying degrees of success in predicting the size of coalitions. The size principle was least successful in predicting the size of the Israeli governing coalitions, according to tests performed by Browne (1971, 1973) and Nachmias (1974). Other deductive theories offered by Leiserson (1970) and Gamson (1961) were also unsuccessful in predicting the Israeli situation. Consequently De Swaan concluded that Israel is a difficult case for all coalitionary theories (1970).

All coalitionary theories assume, implicitly or explicitly, that smaller winning coalitions will be more policy efficient. The smaller the size, the greater the individual inducement to remain on the winning side and the less the diversity of interest to be accommodated, either on policy matters (De Swaan, 1973), or in terms of ideological distance (Axelrod, 1970). It is important then to compare the difference between various sizes of coalitions in terms of their policy relevancy in the context of Israeli politics.

## ISRAELI POLITICAL COALITIONS AND THEIR STABILITY

*A Comparison Between Sizes of Coalitions*

The Israeli Knesset consists of 120 members who are elected by a system of proportional representation. The entire country constitutes one voting zone, and citizens vote for party lists rather than for individual politicians (Rae, 1971). This method deviates from the zero sum condition, more applicable to single member district competition. Since Riker himself had relaxed the sociological law of coalition concerning the information condition as cited above, an Israeli coalition could be expected to be larger than the mathematical majority of 61 seats. Three types of coalition sizes will be examined next, in order to determine which "will ensure winning," in Riker's words.

*Minimum Winning Coalitions (MWC).* Axelrod (1970) who studied the politics of coalitions in Italy, a country whose system resembles the Israeli one in many respects (Arian and Barnes, 1974; Levite and Torrow, 1981), operationalized the sociological deviation from the mathematical size principle and set it at 5 percent. In the Israeli context 5 percent is translated into 6 seats, and hence, 67 seats or less would constitute a minimum winning coalition.

There is no logical reason to accept this number. The deductive theories referred to coalitions of individuals. In Israel, as well as in other multi-party systems, formation of coalitions is conducted among groups and not among individual players. The unit of analysis is the party. This difference in the nature of the political game, adds another dimension to the definition of the size of a coalition. The nature of the political game in Israel is similar to what Lucas (1974) calls a "weighted game," where each player has different weight according to the size of the party he or she represents. When a party consists of three members, its weight will be noted by the term ($a_3$) and when it includes 50 members it will be signified as ($a_{50}$). Hence, there is no reason to consider changes in the size of the coalition as a continuous function, that is the addition or subtraction of one member after another as required in the regular n-person game. The size of the coalition in a weighted game varies in a step or quantum fashion, where the last player (party) added to a coalition that is just short of its 51 percent, i.e., the minimal level of victory, may be so large as to render the coalition oversized (Doron, 1978). To demonstrate, a trivial example will suffice. Consider three parties – A, B and C, of equal size. In order to form a coalition any combination of two of the parties would suffice. Clearly, a coalition of two against the third party would be 15 percent greater than required for a mathematical or the sociologically adjusted majority.

Since 61 is the number of seats necessary for a minimum winning coalition in the Israeli Knesset, it may be that no combination of parties in a given coalition will yield a number that ranges from ($67-a_i$) to 66, ..... 61 seats. Thus, coalition of 68 seats should also be considered a minimal winning when ($67-a_i$) and $a_i$=2 or 4 seats. Table 1 shows that of the 28 coalition governments that have ruled Israel since 1949, 14 had 68 members or less. In the light of the many possibilities pertaining to size variation this 50 percent level of success in predicting the size of a coalition adds credence to our argument. Among the 14 minimal coalitions, six won in the strict mathematical sense, i.e., the subtraction of one party could have undermined the coalition.

Table 1: Size, type, and percentage deviation over minimum of Israeli political coalitions: 1949-1981

| Year of formulation | Size of coalition | Size of main party in coalition | Additional members needed for minimum coalition n=68 | Size of other partners in coalition | Size over minimum number of seats | Size over minimum as % of Knesset | Type of coalition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1949,1950 | 73 | Mapai (48)[a] | 20 | Religious Bloc (16) Pro (5), Sephardim (4) | 5 | 4 | OS |
| 1951 | 67 | Mapai (50) | 18 | N.R.P. (10), AI (3), PAI (2) | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1952,1954 | 87 | Mapai (50) | 18 | N.R.P. (10), GZ (23), Progressives (4) | 19 | 16 | OS |
| 1955 | 64 | Mapai (50) | 18 | N.R.P. (10), Progressives (4) | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1955,1958 | 80 | Mapai (45) | 23 | N.R.P. (11), Pro (5), AA (10), Mapam (9) | 12 | 10 | OS |
| 1959 | 85 | Mapai (52) | 16 | N.R.P. (12), Mapam (9), AA (7), Pro (5) | 17 | 14 | OS |
| 1961,63,64 | 68 | Mapai (46) | 22 | N.R.P. (12), AA (8), PAI (2) | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1966 | 75 | Alignment (49) | 19 | N.R.P. (11), Mapam (8), PAI (2), IL (5) | 7 | 6 | OS |
| 1967 | 111 | Alignment (49) | 19 | Same as 1966 + GAHAL (26), Rafi (10) | 43 | 36 | GC |
| 1969 | 106 | Alignment (49) | 19 | Same as 1966 + GAHAL (22), Rafi (9) | 38 | 32 | GC |
| 1969 | 102 | Labor (60) | 8 | N.R.P. (12), IL (4), GAHAL (26) | 34 | 28 | GC |
| 1970 | 76 | Labor (60) | 8 | N.R.P. (12), IL (4) | 8 | 7 | OS |
| 1974 | 61 | Labor (54) | 14 | IL (4), Civil Rights (3) | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1974 | 68 | Labor (54) | 14 | N.R.P. (10), IL (4) | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1977 | 57 | Labor (53) | 15 | IL (4) | 0 | 0 | MWC |

Table 1: Size, type and percentage deviation over minimum of Israeli political coalitions: 1949-1981

| Year of formulation | Size of coalition | Size of main party in coalition | Additional members needed for minimum coalition n=68 | Size of other partners in coalition | Size over minimum number of seats | Size over minimum as % of Knesset | Type of coalition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1977 | 61 | Likud (45) | 23 | N.R.P. (12), AI (4) | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1977 | 63 | Likud (45) | 23 | N.R.P. (12), AI (4), PAI (1), Dayan (1) | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1977 | 78 | Likud (45) | 23 | Same as 1977 + DMC (15) | 10 | 8 | OS |
| 1978 | 70 | Likud (45) | 23 | Same as 1977 – Shinui (8) | 2 | 1 | OS |
| 1979 | 68 | Likud (45) | 23 | Same as 1978 – Techya (2) | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1980 | 67 | Likud (45) | 23 | Same as 1979 – Dayan | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1981 | 63 | Likud (45) | 23 | Same as 1980 – parts of DMC | 0 | 0 | MWC |
| 1981 | 61 | Likud (49) | 19 | N.R.P. (6), Tami (3), AI (4) | 0 | 0 | MWC |

Key:

N.R.P. = National Religious Party
AI = Agudat Israel
PAI = Poale Agudat Israel
IL = Independent Liberals
AA = Ahdut Ha'avoda
GZ = General Zionists
OS = Oversized
MWC= Minimum winning coalition
GC = Grand Coalition
DMC = Democratic Movement for Change

Table 1 reveals a point of interest. Most of the minimal winning coalitions have been formed in recent years. Begin's coalition is exactly as large as mathematically required. Is it possible that after a generation Israeli politicians have learned the art of coalition formation? This question will be addressed in the section dealing with oversized coalitions. Among these 14 instances of coalition formation, three are particularly interesting. These are the coalitions that were formed in 1967 and in 1969, and boasted the participation of almost the entire Knesset. To the explanation of these Grand Coalitions we turn next.

*Grand Coalitions.* 'Wall to Wall' or Grand Coalitions are usually formed during times of war or severe national crisis. England during World War II, and Austria after it, are merely two examples of governments which drew their base of support from almost all political parties in the parliament. The decision regarding the division of spoils becomes less important to the participants in the coalition when the existence of the entire political system is threatened. Survival becomes the only salient issue, and all considerations not related to this goal are temporarily shelved. In this situation the zero sum condition becomes meaningless. The political game changes its nature from a regular to a super game. Namely one similar to zero sum between the system and the source of the threats.

The threat to Israel during the month of May 1967, when President Nasser of Egypt blocked the southern water ways, expelled the United Nations peacekeeping force, and moved his army into the Sinai peninsula, was presumably tangible. Consequently, parliamentary and public pressure convinced Israel's Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to expand his coalition to include Begin's Gahal bloc, and Moshe Dayan's Rafi party. This move, which transformed the already oversized coalition to a grand coalition, also had long range political effects. It provided broad public legitimization of Begin as a state leader (Levite and Tarrow, 1981). It also opened the way for Rafi, a splinter of Mapai, to return to its umbrella party. Shimon Peres, present leader of the Labor Party, a former member of Rafi, benefited directly from that move back.

When the level of tension is reduced, it would be expected that the size of the coalition would shrink accordingly. Other issues become salient, survival is ensured, and competition over political spoils resumes. Although Israel won a decisive victory in the 1967 War, international pressures, difficulties relating to the future of the territories captured in the War, and the "War of Attrition" initiated by Nasser in 1969, sustained the grand coalition for some time. Nonetheless, as predicted, a reduction in its size occurred in 1969, first from 111 to 106, and then again to 102 Knesset members. In 1970, the coalition returned to its 'normal' oversized range.

In respect to the policy flexibility required in light of the prospects of major political changes in months to come, a Grand Coalition may be an available alternative for the ruling Likud party. With increased international pressures, potential unrest caused by nationalists on the extreme right wing of the political spectrum, the Syrian threat from the North and the Lebanese "problem", Begin and his successor Shamir may consider it expedient to share responsibility with other parties in the Knesset, especially the Labor Party. Labor in turn, who may have a political incentive to stay in opposition until hardships are reduced or the government collapses, might not be able to do so because of public pressure. Therefore, given this probable scenario, Labor would resume national responsibility and help form a grand coalition in months to come.

*Oversized Coalitions.* The deductive theories of coalition assume that the members of the coalition will receive payoffs in accordance with the size of their contribution to the

coalition. This means that if a coalition could form minimally without the assistance of an extra member, it would stay minimal. Why then do we find, as shown in Table 1, eleven instances in which the size of the coalition was more than sufficient to ensure victory and implementation of desired policies? We propose two alternative explanations for oversized coalitions, the Dummy party, and the internal-external instability explanation.

A. *The Dummies*. if a coalition could form without an extra member (party), then it would be expected that that member would not receive payments commensurate with his size. A party in an oversized coalition that receives little or no payment for participation is labelled "dummy".

During the 29 years of the Mapai-Labor based oversized coalition, several such dummies existed. In these coalitions two parties consistently shared almost all the spoils, leaving the others very little of the coalition value. If value of coalitions is determined by the number and the importance of the ministries a party controls (Browne and Feste, 1975), then the high value of Mapai (Labor) is defined by the fact that it was constantly able to control the Prime Minister's office, as well as the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education and Culture, Agriculture, Communications and Police. The National Religious Party, an almost constant partner of all ruling parties in Israel, controlled the important Internal Affairs, Welfare, and Religious Affairs ministries. Together the N.R.P. and Labor exhausted most of the coalition value. Other partners, most notably the Independent Liberals (the former Progressive Party), or Poale Agudat Israel, receive little (Ministry of Tourism, for example), or no payment when included in oversized coalitions.

Moreover, when an important ministry was transferred to coalition partners, the ruling party made sure that certain essential functions of the ministry were removed. Thus, for example, when the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was given to the General Zionists (later the Liberal Party) in 1952, many of its powers were transferred to the Ministry of Finance, controlled by Mapai. Consequently, according to Nachmias (1974), as framers of the coalition, Mapai were able to control up to 90 percent of the national budget and no less than 75 percent.

Clearly, the main coalition party would like to expand the margins of control by adding additional members. It benefits by obtaining a broader base of legitimation and actual support in the Knesset for policies and laws, without excessive remuneration. But why should dummies join a coalition? The incentive for small parties to join a coalition in a dominant party system (Arian, 1979) is presumably related to their attempt to increase the visibility of their leadership between elections and to receive, for example, some payoffs – jobs for active members, grants and other monetary transfers for supporters. Opposition status will yield even less payments.

The small dummy parties are closer to what Eckstein (1960) defines as pressure or interest groups, than to the regular definition of a political party – an organ competing for control over the political apparatus. These are parties that, according to objective and subjective assessment by their leaders, had no prospects for extensive development. They represent a defined body of voters whose interests they attempt to promote. Agudat Israel, the ultra orthodox party, is an excellent example. Not even a party in the Western sense, it receives consistently between 4 to 5 seats in the Knesset. Its representatives, members of the coalition, have rarely asked for shares in real power, i.e., ministerial positions, even when they were entitled to such shares in accordance with the prevailing power configuration in the Knesset. The Knesset members of Agudat Israel are emissaries of the 'Council of Great Sages', a group of elderly rabbis who dictate policy

position to their political representatives. Hence, since the dominating party in the coalition can ensure the support of Agudat Israel on almost all major policy issues by altering various laws which are incompatible with the beliefs of this group, or by allocating resources to their parochial school system, it is more than willing to incorporate this small party as a dummy. The summy party is also satisfied.

B. *Internal-External Instability.* Another explanation for the existence of the oversized coalition is related to the level of uncertainty which exists during the four year interval between elections. The elected government hopes to remain in power for the whole term, yet crises and instability may shorten this period. In order to avoid this there is a tendency to expand the base of coalition by adding more parties to a minimal winning coalition. The instabilities can arise from at least two sources.

*Internal Instability.* Many Israeli parties are conglomerates or blocs of several political factions. For example, the opposition Labor Alignment consists of factional variations on past parties such as Mapai, Rafi, Ahdut Ha'avoda, Mapam, Ratz, etc. The ruling Likud Party is also composed of past parties such as Herut and Liberals, the Free Center and other small parties. Such is the situation in the National Religious Party. There is always some likelihood that one faction will split away. If the coalition in minimal and the faction is larger than the 5 percent deviation permitted in the modified model, this split would result in a collapse of the coalition. In smaller sized coalitions, parties have an incentive to use the threat of a split, thereby increasing their bargaining position and their share of the spoils. Prominent leaders of factions who attract personal public support could use this advantageous situation in order to shape policies in accordance with their interest.

The factionalism within Mapai was manifested in the 1960's in the rivalry between the 'old guard' and the younger generation, led by David Ben Gurion, who was a leader of that caliber (Fein, 1967). Ben Gurion did indeed break his faction away from Mapai to form Rafi. The competition among the factions continued in the Labor Party, between Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avoda and Rafi, especially when the latter group, led by Dayan, was in a position to secede and head a right wing coalition. This necessitated the inclusion of an extra member to counterbalance the threat. Mapam, the ultra socialist party, was the candidate chosen by Mapai leaders for that purpose. Etzioni (1959), who studied Israeli politics during the 1950's, identified this strategy as common in a ruling party planning to avoid potential internal coalitionary problems. Its utilization increases the base of the coalition.

Nor is factionalism within the partners of the main coalition party overlooked by the framer of the coalition. Thus, the situations in the National Religious Party, and the Democratic Movement for Change, which split into many factions between 1977 and 1981, some supporting and others opposing the government, created an inducement to enlarge the coalition to an oversized one.

*External Instability.* In a breakthrough study Aumann and Maschler (1964) developed a mathematical solution to n-person games. In essence, they formally described the dynamics of the bargaining situation involved in the process of coalition formation. In order for the coalition to be stable all threats and counter-threats on the part of the parties involved should be balanced. A kind of equilibrium should be attained in which parties in the coalition have no incentive to break away and join the opposition.

This rationale, expressed in the Bargaining Set solution is an abstraction of the difficulties faced by coalition framers in their attempt to establish a stable institution. Coalitionary and party discipline in accordance with agreements signed prior to inauguration is required of all members of the coalition. Yet these agreements are valid only if the partners decide not to break them. If it is posited that the members of the coalition, in addition to maximizing payoffs, are seeking ways of securing conditions which will enable them to enjoy their gains, then they may decide to add extra members to the coalition. This creates a situation wherein the threat of departure by one party will not jeopardize the ability of the government to continue its rule. When dummies are added, oversized coalitions may become very attractive.

The opposition may try to attract members of the coalition, and some may be tempted to leave and join the anti-coalition ranks. Since the ruling party retains most of the spoils for itself, factions in partner parties which, in their opinion, do not receive sufficient recompense, may decide to leave the coalition. This creates a tendency, in oversized coalitions, to reduce their size during the four year span between elections. It was for this reason, the Shinui faction of the Democratic Movement for Change withdrew from the coalition shortly after the DMC joined the coalition in 1977.

During the Second Knesset Mapai was able to hold power with the N.R.P. and the Progressive Party, with or without the General Zionists. Likewise, in the Third Knesset, no single partner could undermine the position of Mapai as the ruling party by withdrawing from the coalition. The inexperienced Likud party was able to ratify the Camp David agreement in the Knesset even without the endorsement of some of its own major party members, i.e., Itzak Shamir and Moshe Arens, then Speaker of the Knesset and Chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, respectively. (Both moved up to assume the positions of Foreign Minister and Israeli Ambassador to the United States, respectively.) It relied primarily on the support of the DMC. Likewise, Begin's coalition was not affected by the withdrawal of certain members of his own party Herut, and of the DMC that joined the opposition. Enough members remained to support the government. Hence, the threats and counter threats balanced out, and this was reflected in the eventual size of the coalition.

*The 1981 Minimum Winning Coalition*

The party configuration that prevailed after the October election in 1981 made it very difficult to form an oversized coalition. Nine political parties are represented at present in the Knesset: the Likud (49 seats); Labor (48, the Civil Rights Movement included); N.R.P. (6); Agudat Israel and the Communists (4 seats each); Tami and Techiya (3 each); Telem and Shinui (2 each) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1981). The present coalition consists of the Likud, the two religious parties (N.R.P. and its splinter Tami, based on Oriental Jews). Agudat Israel is also included as a comparable dummy party. Together the coalition is mathematically minimal based on the support of 61 Knesset members.

Under normal circumstances this could have been the most desirable arrangement for a government, since it is not obliged to share payments with too many partners. But, since the future holds out arduous tasks for the government, among them: provision of autonomy for the Arabs of the West Bank, countering threats from the Syrians, solving the Lebanon issue, and combating a record rate of inflation, the present coalitionary base may be perceived as too narrow for successful policy executions.

On the basis of the arguments advanced in this study, it can be concluded that this perception is misleading. Since the coalition size is minimal each of the three parties can, in turn, become what Shapley called, a "pivot" (1953), its bargaining power increasing because without it the coalition would not be able to rule. This situation is of extreme importance for coalition formation, and indeed the small partners receive greater spoils than their relative size would indicate. For example, the three members of Tami hold two ministerial posts and one position of deputy minister. The allocation was in relation to power and not to size. If the partner is satisfied, he will leave the coalition only if the opposition offers greater payoffs.

It is not clear what inducements Labor could hold out to the three religious parties that would offer them more than they already have, without antagonizing the majority of its secular supporters. In addition, when small partners threaten to break away, the counter threat could always be to dissolve the Knesset and call for new elections. During the time interval until elections are held, the government acts as a 'caretaker' with almost complete freedom on policy matters. Small parties may not consider such a situation desirable.

Begin, the framer of the coalition, anticipating these and similar difficulties, stemming from members of his own party, took certain measures to ensure tranquility within his own party ranks. Unprecedented in Israeli politics, many of the 61 members of the coalition hold both representative and executive power positions, either real or symbolic. Thus, the Prime Minister had two deputies in the Government and one in his Office; there are two deputy Ministers of Agriculture, and some other ministers have deputies as well. Other members are chairpersons of various Knesset committees. Therefore, practically each member of the coalition has something to lose by not following policy dictates. Shamir, who replaced Begin, has maintained a similar structure of payoffs. In this light it seems that only political errors made by some of the inexperienced political novices of the coalition could jeopardize its existence.

## CONCLUSION

In the social sciences it is commonly understood that conclusions drawn from research on ongoing events are rather hazardous, because the very situations and issues researched are in a state of flux. The domain of research is not always defined, since the scientist cannot possibly account for all significant variables that affect the issue studied. Nonetheless, on the basis of the analysis advanced in this study in concentration on one independent political variable, it can be concluded that the present size of the coalition in large was in many ways policy efficient. The narrow-based coalition may ensure effectiveness in policy execution.

## POSTSCRIPT

The two years that have elapsed since Begin formed his 1981 government have evinced several instances of major policy making and execution, the most important being Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. Other primary examples are Israel's involvement in an extended war in Lebanon, the first war an Israeli government has engaged itself in without national consensus; the coalition withstood a series of economic crises that have almost impaired the state's monetary system. Moreover, Begin resigned as Prime Minister in September 1983, and Shamir succeeded him.

During this period the coalition numbered no more than 64 members. This minimal winning coalition now rests on 46 members of the Likud bloc, three members of the Techiya, two of the late Moshe Dayan's Telem party. The three religious parties continue to contribute to the coalition as follows: six members of the N.R.P., four from Agudat Israel and three members of Tami. Despite all this, the coalition has been able to maneuver flexibly on various policy issues, deciding and implementing successful as well as unsuccessful policies.

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