STRATIFICATION IN ISRAELI SOCIETY: IS THERE A MIDDLE GROUPING?

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Both popular and scholarly analyses of stratification in Israeli society typically identify two broad groupings of persons: Asian-African and European-American. Comparisons of some socio-economic variables that indicate a "modern-traditional" continuum (such as number of children, age at marriage, and male-female differences in education) using analysis of variance suggest that a middle grouping can be identified of persons from countries with a non-oriental Sephardic tradition. Countries that fall into the middle grouping on a number of indicators are: Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Egypt, and India-Pakistan.

INTRODUCTION

For the most part, both popular and scholarly analysis of stratification in Israeli society is conducted in terms of two broad groupings. They are variously called Oriental and Western, Sephardic and Ashkenazi, Traditional and Modern. Official Israel Government statistics follow this schema so that many items are presented separately for persons born in (or with fathers from) Asia-Africa (hereafter AA) or Europe-America (hereafter EA). Many analysts have suggested that this is too simple, for the most part asserting that within these large groupings one must also examine major differences among persons from various individual countries. There have been only vague hints, however, that the basic two-group formulation itself might be re-examined, in that there exists what may be called a "middle grouping," i.e. some country-of-origin groups which fairly consistently fall into an identifiable middle position on some important dimensions, or at least appear frequently near the center margins of the two major groupings. This article takes up that possibility. While on many dimensions the middle grouping is vague. I will attempt to show that it is discernible on enough indicators so that further research is warranted.

Investigation of this question is important for several reasons. One is a general one, the question of the extent to which migrant groups may maintain earlier characteristics in a new setting. This article indicates that for at least two decades, many immigrant

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groups in Israel did maintain a fair number of the traits with which they came, despite often strong pressure to change. It is of both general interest and of specific relevance to Israel to begin to examine more closely the assumption that in addition to factors of social class, education, religiosity, etc., which any individual has, there are aspects of one's country or grouping of origin which also influence an individual's make-up.

In the specific Israeli context, the concept of a middle grouping may also be important because, for better or worse, Israeli society has often been seen (by outsiders as well as by its own citizens) as divided into the two general groupings just named. One must be just to all those who insist that immigrants are individuals, that all cultures should be and are respected, and who treat their fellow-Israelis accordingly. It is also clear that there has been a great deal of individual social mobility in Israel. Nevertheless, it is wrong to deny that there is in some quarters the (at least tacit) assumption that there are general cultural traits common to each of the two broad groupings. There is a further assumption that social pressures are being exerted (or have been in the past, at least) to change the culture of the "bottom" grouping[1] so as to lead to an Israel which embodies the culture of those at the "top." In other words, Israel, in the view of many, is to be a "modern" society, reflecting the culture of the "West," and Oriental Jews are to be moved in that direction. Those in the category which is assumed to require changing are put at the bottom of the "prestige scale." (See, for example, Kraus, 1982.)

The existence of such concepts of dichotomy (perhaps often only tacitly acknowledged but probably understood by all), may well lead to conflicts of identity, particularly for those in the "lower" category. On one hand, many want intensely to become "Israelis," and one way to do that is to move toward conformity with those in the dominant culture. On the other, there is often deep attachment to one's own culture, as well as resentment at being pressured to change. This may perhaps create an even more intense determination to preserve it and to assert its worth, through a variety of means including, for example, having larger families, maintaining cultural exclusiveness, and political action.

If there is a "top" and a "bottom," we can best define "middle" (at least as a beginning) as individuals and groups who share some traits of both. For Israel, two segments might be so placed. One consists of those individuals from Oriental communities who have achieved some social mobility and those who have acquired some of the characteristics of the "Western" culture, but who continue to value some "Oriental" ways as well. The other segment is made up of those groups whose members entered Israeli society with some characteristics from each of the two broad groupings and who may still value various customs, preserve their language, or for other reasons be impelled to maintain closer residential proximity. If there are such country-of-origin groups which have a foot in both camps, it becomes a significant research question to examine the effects, how they have defined their identities either as individuals or as groups, and whether their adjustment and integration into Israeli society has been different from that of groups or individuals who are clearly placed (by themselves or by others) into one of the two more conventionally recognized groupings.

The notion of a middle grouping arose from preliminary work which I have done on a study of the integration and adjustment of Jews from Turkey, and it is as an outgrowth of this that one can make at least one unambiguous statement of a situation which can potentially create the kinds of conflicts just described. In addition to the Western-Oriental dichotomy, Israeli Jewish society is divided by many into two religious groupings, Ashkenazi and Sephardic. The origins and dimensions of these two wings are complex and need not be gone into here. Suffice it to say that in the minds of many

Israelis, they coincide with the Western-Oriental division. To the extent that Israelis are aware that there are also Sephardis who are not Oriental (the definition of Oriental being origin in Asia or Africa, and primarily Arab countries), these are placed in a kind of limbo. In addition to Jews from Turkey, the non-Oriental Sephardis include those from Bulgaria and Greece, and many from Yugoslavia. In Israel in large numbers since shortly after the founding of the state, they have been joined more recently by Jews from Italy, Spain, and Argentina (in sizable numbers). The central concept, then, around which the potential middle grouping can be defined is those Jewish communities which have historically been identified with Judaeo-Spanish or Ladino culture, in contrast to the Northern European, Ashkenazi, Yiddish-based groups, and to the Arab-influenced communities (which are regarded by the Spanish-Sephardic groups as a quite distinct category, although called Sephardic as well). The list of potential "middle grouping countries," then, is as follows:

Turkey.
Bulgaria.
Greece.
Yugoslavia.
Italy (with considerable "Latin" influence though it is also European, with a high proportion of Sephardis).
Spain.
Argentina. (Immigrants from other Latin American countries are too few in number for analysis in this article.)
Egypt. (Included here because even though it is an Arab country, my analysis and much literature indicate that Egyptian Jews are a major exception to the general "Oriental" pattern and should be included in a middle grouping.)
India-Pakistan (not Judaeo-Spanish, but also neither European nor Arab, so that it is worth investigating their appropriateness for the middle grouping).

METHODOLOGY

The overall hypothesis of this article is that there are sufficient distinctions on some important statistically-measurable social and economic indicators to warrant distinguishing the above-named countries as a separate grouping, and using this as one of the bases for further research on their integration and adjustment in Israel. To this end, the basic technique has been to arrange the data according to the three groupings, and

(a) To use analysis of variance to determine whether the differences are statistically significant. The F test has been applied to the three groupings together, and the T test for the middle grouping vs. the AA and EA groupings individually.[2]

(b) To supplement the statistical analysis by inspection of the data, to see whether other patterns emerge which may be suggested in relation to our hypothesis. This has proved to be particularly useful where the statistics are ambiguous.

(c) To examine the individual countries on each indicator, so that we may see to what extent there may be important exceptions within any of the groupings. Given the complex and often ambiguous nature of the statistical data at this point in our research, it would not be justifiable to apply the definition of "middle" too rigorously. Although some "middle" countries fall more consistently toward the AA or EA patterns on some of the indicators than do others, we believe that it is justified to conclude, as will be

shown, that all of the countries which we hypothesize as "middle" fall into a middle range enough times to warrant the label. This is particularly true when we note that in only a very few instances do countries in the AA and EA groupings fall outside the ranges for their respective categories.

(There are several distinct country variations within the middle grouping. Turkey frequently falls rather near the AA ranges, something which can probably be at least partially explained by the fact that immigrants from Turkey came from the poor and lower classes, many of the wealthier Jews remaining in Turkey to this day. The Bulgarians – and somewhat less frequently those from Yugoslavia – on the other hand, consistently resemble the EA grouping. This is explainable at least in part by historical circumstances, and by the fact that these were communities of "total transfer.")

DATA SOURCES

1. The 1961 and 1972 censuses (in the latter case mostly from unpublished data obtained through the Data Bank of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Hebrew University.)

2. Other published statistics.

3. Data from the study by Moshe Sicron, *Immigration to Israel 1948-53*, which includes some information about characteristics before immigration as well.

4. Several sociological studies of individual topics.

(Note: Specific sources for individual items are available from the author.)

LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA

1. On some items data are incomplete, or data for different time periods are not in strictly comparable categories or form. Also, Spain, Italy and Argentina were often omitted from earlier data, and some countries are at times combined.

2. The statistical data are aggregates, and surely hide many important variations among individuals and sub-groups within each country group.

3. As will be seen below, no country hypothesized as being in the middle grouping falls there on all items, and some EA and AA countries occasionally fall into the "middle."

4. The questions of how the statistically measurable characteristics may be related to culture, identity, feelings, prestige hierarchies, and degrees of integration (qualitative and quantitative) are extremely complex, and are not discussed in depth in this article. Clearly, much more work is needed, but it is my general conclusion that the data are suggestive enough to justify further research.

INDICATORS AND FINDINGS

The indicators on which I have been able to obtain data, and the general findings on each, are as follows:

1. Familial, i.e. fertility, and age at marriage. On both there is a high degree of statistical significance and the "middle grouping" is distinguished sharply in most instances.

2. Educational. In the 1961 census data the grouping distinction for literacy is quite clear, and interestingly shows a larger gap between the middle and AA groupings than between the middle and the EAs, and sharper divisions for women than for men. In 1972 much of the significance for years of study disappears as "Israeli factors" seem to begin to work, but it re-appears to some extent among the Israeli-born. (Possible reasons for such patterns will be discussed in the sections below.)

3. Hebrew. For 1961 – literacy in Hebrew and fluency in Hebrew and for 1972 – knowledge of writing. A fairly distinct non-Oriental Sephardic grouping emerges here, though not strictly one which is in the "middle."

4. Economic, i.e. occupations. There are varying levels of support for the hypothesis for different occupational categories. The "middle grouping" is generally more distinct from the AA than from the EA category. The pattern is quite complex, however. Data on other economic items such as income were not available to me in sufficiently usable form.

5. "Integrational," i.e. intermarriage and residential concentration. The former yields only weak support for the hypothesis. For the latter, support varies from city to city, and generally shows a larger gap between middle and AA than between middle and EA.

Table 1 presents fertility data for foreign-born women for 1961 and 1972.[3]. The reasons for differing rates of fertility are complex, and the "clustering of factors is difficult to disentangle." (Muhsam, 1973; and Matras, 1965, 1979.) Since, however, in

Fertility

Table 1. Average Number of Children of Foreign-Born Women by Grouping and Age of Mother, 1961 and 1972.

Grouping	No. Cases	Age of Mother 20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54
1961								
AA	7	2.10	4.35	5.33	6.14	6.31	6.68	6.95
Middle	4	–	2.85	2.85	3.05	3.45	3.23	3.47
EA	7	1.20	1.75	2.11	2.26	2.21	2.14	1.97
F Ratio		3.186	69.715	56.955	79.049	71.959	67.013	81.550
F Probability		.1141	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
T Probability								
M vs. AA		–	.004	.000	.000	.000	.004	.002
M vs. EA		–	.009	.021	.020	.013	.017	.014
1972								
AA	8	1.26	2.26	3.44	4.42	4.78	5.29	5.21
Middle	9	1.16	1.99	2.89	2.91	2.84	3.20	3.46
EA	8	.78	1.46	2.33	2.40	2.48	2.76	1.85
F Ratio		13.541	12.467	11.152	11.132	30.553	47.103	19.439
F Probability		.0002	.0003	.0006	.0006	.0000	.0000	.0000
T Probability								
M vs. AA		.395	.178	.057	.006	.000	.000	.014
M vs. EA		.002	.004	.034	.336	.270	.012	.000

the words of one Israeli demographer (Muhsam, 1973) "the most outstanding feature of differential fertility in the Jewish population of Israel has always been the cleavage between women of European origin and those of Afro-Asian origin," we are justified in confining our analysis here to examining whether country of origin yields a significant middle grouping. It does, for nearly every age group.

It is not very surprising that there are clear differences in the 1961 data. It is more striking, however, that these differences continue to be quite distinct in 1972. The analysis of variance is significant for every age group in 1972, and the T test yields only 5 of 14 items which are not so. It is not readily apparent why the three youngest age groups of middle grouping women, i.e. those who came to Israel as children, should suddenly resemble the AA women, or why the differentiation between middle and EA groupings women should be interrupted for the 35-39 and 40-44 age groups, but on the whole the three-grouping hypothesis is supported for fertility.

Table 2. Number of children 1972: Position of Middle Grouping Countries and EA or AA Exceptions from their Grouping Patterns.

	Age of Mother							
Country	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50+	Overall Pattern
Turkey	AA	M	M	M	M	M	M	Middle
Egypt	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	Middle
India-Pak.	M	AA	AA	AA	AA	AA	AA	AA
Yugoslavia	–	–	AA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Bulgaria	M	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Greece	AA	M	EA	EA	EA	M	M	Mixed
Spain	–	AA	AA	AA	–	AA	AA	AA
Italy	AA	EA	–	EA	M	EA	M	Mixed
Argentina	EA	M	M	EA	EA	M	M	Mixed
AA countries closer to middle mean than to AA mean	Iraq Alg	Iraq Syr	Syr	Syr	None	None	None	
EA countries closer to middle mean than to EA mean	None	None	None	None	USA	USA	None	

For means see Table 1.
For explanation of terms see text.

Table 2 examines individual countries for 1972. Because of statistical complexities we will use a relatively simple measure, i.e. whether a country falls closer to the mean for its own grouping than to the mean for the adjoining grouping.[4] To generalize a pattern for each country, we have designated several overall ones. We have labelled as EA or AA respectively those countries for which individual items fall predominantly closer to the EA or AA mean than to the middle grouping mean. Those with most items in the

middle grouping range we call "middle," and we use the label "mixed" for those countries which have fewer middle items and which also often have some items in both the EA and the AA ranges.

The noteworthy facts in Table 2 are (1) that five of the nine countries which we are hypothesizing as "middle" do in fact fall into middle or mixed patterns, (2) that among the EA and AA countries, the number falling outside their own grouping ranges is far smaller. On the whole, we can conclude that in combination with Table 1, our hypothesis receives considerable support on the fertility indicator.

Age at Marriage

Another indicator on which there are usually clear distinctions between "traditional" and "modern" is age at marriage, and the Israeli data reflect this strongly. We have data for persons married in each year between 1954 and 1962, and for the 1961 and 1972 censuses. Figures were calculated for 1954, 1958 and 1962 and the census years (Table 3).[5] It is notable that for all of these, the averages for the three groupings remain quite distinct, all three moving in the same direction to about the same degree, and in only 10 out of 36 instances does the T-test score fall outside the limits of significance (and five of those ten fall below .05, the level at which one may say there is *some* possible relationship). It is also striking that some of the middle grouping countries which appeared closer to the EA or AA patterns as regards fertility move towards the middle on the age at marriage indicator. Bulgaria – EA in fertility – scores middle with 13 middles and only five EAs. Greece, which was mixed on fertility, is classified middle on age at marriage (12 middles, two EAs, two AAs). Egypt clearly remains in place (16 middles, two AAs), as does Turkey to a lesser extent (nine middles, seven AAs). Only Yugoslavia remains clearly EA. (India-Pakistan, Spain, Italy and Argentina have too few data to measure.) The number of EA and AA countries falling out of their own respective grouping ranges is again very small. As remarked earlier, while the groupings are clearly not of such strength that any country of the potential middle grouping will fit there on all indicators, it is apparent, and will be more apparent below, that all of them fit into a middle pattern a sufficient number of times to justify the labels in general.

Education

The "modern-traditional" dichotomy is also often reflected in data on education. This is so although the reasons for differences are complex, in that they reflect not only such factors as inherent value attached to learning, but also opportunities for school attendance, need for education in order to gain access to certain occupations, etc. It can also be said that formal education is not the only avenue to social and economic advancement, though it is increasingly a central necessity as societies become more modern. It is also true that although for the most part the Jews' high valuation of education resulted in their being among the best educated segments of society in their countries of residence, the absolute levels of education nevertheless reflected the context of their societies. Thus, we would expect the differences among AA and EA immigrants in Israel to be large, and they, in fact, are.

Table 3. Average Age at Marriage.

Grouping	No. Cases	Persons Marrying in 1954 Male	1954 Female	1958 Male	1958 Female	1962 Male	1962 Female
AA	7	26.0 yrs.	21.6 yrs.	26.7 yrs.	22.5 yrs.	27.1 yrs.	22.6 yrs.
Middle	6	28.9	25.3	28.9	25.2	31.1	26.3
EA	7	33.4	29.3	34.1	30.3	35.6	31.4
F Ratio		13.580	32.376	11.024	53.331	14.953	15.003
F Probability		.0004	.0000	.0010	.0000	.0002	.0002
T Probability							
M vs. AA		.009	.000	.058	.003	.026	.006
M vs. EA		.031	.010	.023	.000	.045	.032

1961 Census		Males				Females			
		Married Abroad		Married in Israel		Married Abroad		Married in Israel	
Grouping	No. Cases	% Married to age 19	Average age	% Married to age 19	Average age	% Married to age 17	Average age	% Married to age 17	Average age
AA	8	23.0%	23.9 yrs	10.9%	25.0 yrs	39.5%	19.2 yrs	18.5%	20.9 yrs
Middle	5	5.4	27.4	2.8	27.0	11.7	22.8	11.3	22.4
EA	8	3.0	27.6	1.3	28.1	4.1	24.0	2.7	24.4
F Ratio		24.878	14.735	17.931	17.185	46.993	41.673	28.428	51.433
F Probability		.0000	.0002	.0001	.0001	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
T Probability									
M vs. AA		.002	.003	.009	.006	.000	.000	.033	.005
M vs. EA		.079	.773	.002	.101	.003	.014	.002	.001

1972 Census		Males		Females	
Grouping	No. Cases	% Married to age 19	Average age	% Married to age 17	Average age
AA	8	10.5%	24.9 yrs.	21.7%	20.7 yrs.
Middle	9	4.3	26.7	10.5	22.7
EA	11	1.6	27.6	3.2	23.8
F Ratio		22.126	20.394	24.585	52.881
F Probability		.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
T Probability					
M vs. AA		.004	.004	.001	.000
M vs. EA		.024	.033	.006	.007

We have one relevant datum for each census year: literacy in some language for 1961, and years of study for 1972. For 1961, it is likely that the data still strongly reflect literacy rates prior to each group's immigration. Opportunities for continuing education for adults during the early, difficult years of the state were not plentiful. Table 4 presents data for the immigrants of 1948-54, the largest group. While the F test is significant

Table 4. Literacy 1961. Immigrants of 1948-54.

	Age group			
	14-29	30-44	45-64	65+
AA Countries		MALES		
Syria-Lebanon	96.2%	89.0%	81.0%	80.0%
Iraq	90.9	82.0	67.1	55.4
Yemen	94.1	66.9	60.1	54.0
Iran	93.0	80.7	59.1	50.0
Libya	91.5	81.2	53.2	44.7
Algeria-Tunisia	94.5	87.5	67.0	55.3
Morocco	93.0	79.5	55.8	44.4
Average	93.3	81.0	63.3	54.8
Middle Countries				
Turkey	94.5	87.6	74.0	63.5
Egypt	97.3	94.3	83.6	83.3
Yugoslavia	100.0	100.0	97.9	100.0
Bulgaria	99.1	98.5	96.7	95.0
Greece	100.0	91.3	88.6	76.2
Average	98.2	94.3	88.2	83.6
EA Countries				
USSR	99.6	99.2	98.6	96.0
Poland	99.1	98.7	96.8	93.2
Romania	98.9	98.3	96.0	91.0
Germany-Austria	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Czechoslovakia	99.1	100.0	100.0	96.5
Hungary	99.5	100.0	99.7	99.3
America-Oceania	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Average	99.5	99.5	98.7	96.0
F Ratio	27.578	24.132	38.765	24.525
F Probability	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
T Probability				
M vs. AA	.000	.001	.000	.000
M vs. EA	.345	.173	.168	.349

Table 4 / continued . . .

	Age group			
	14-29	30-44	45-64	65+
AA Countries		FEMALES		
Syria-Lebanon	90.4	75.0	28.6	30.3
Iraq	78.1	49.4	19.2	7.8
Yemen	73.0	11.1	3.0	2.2
Iran	73.7	37.3	12.5	6.0
Libya	76.9	45.0	20.2	7.7
Algeria-Tunisia	84.4	58.2	34.0	6.0
Morocco	82.5	43.4	13.4	7.4
Average	79.9	45.6	18.7	9.6
Middle Countries				
Turkey	89.6	73.7	49.7	25.2
Egypt	96.6	91.3	75.5	40.8
Yugoslavia	100.0	98.7	98.7	97.8
Bulgaria	98.6	98.7	93.2	72.6
Greece	97.1	91.3	84.3	40.7
Average	96.4	90.7	80.3	55.4
EA Countries				
USSR	99.4	97.9	96.5	89.9
Poland	99.5	99.0	93.7	82.7
Romania	99.3	98.2	73.3	43.3
Germany-Austria	99.5	99.2	99.4	98.0
Czechoslovakia	100.0	100.0	99.1	95.1
Hungary	99.6	99.5	99.2	97.1
America-Oceania	100.0	98.7	100.0	–
Average	99.6	98.9	94.5	84.3
F Ratio	40.692	32.883	70.289	30.227
F Probability	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
T Probability				
M vs. AA	.000	.001	.000	.000
M vs. EA	.054	.057	.085	.026

in all cases, the T test suggests that on this indicator the chief difference is between the AA countries and the two other groupings. Inspection of the data in Table 4 also shows that some of the distinctions tend to be greater among the older age groups who grew up outside Israel. It is striking as well that the T test reveals a consistently more significant gap between the middle and EA groupings for women than for men. The lower level of education of women is an item which is always included in a list of the characteristics of "traditional" society.

By 1972, on the other hand, some "Israeli factors" had been at work (a modern society, more plentiful educational facilities, etc.) and it is is notable that for years of study (Table 5) the middle grouping appears for the most part to have broken apart as a

Table 5. Years of Study 1972

	No. Cases	Number of Years: Under Eight M	Under Eight F	Eight M	Eight F	Cumulative M	Cumulative F	Nine-Twelve M	Nine-Twelve F	Thirteen + M	Thirteen + F
Grouping mean					IMMIGRATED 1948-54						
AA	8	33.2%	48.6%	30.2%	23.3%	63.4%	72.0%	24.0%	21.9%	5.0%	2.7%
Middle	8	19.6	25.9	30.4	26.0	50.5	51.6	35.8	34.8	10.5	8.6
EA	7	18.1	13.4	14.2	19.4	32.3	32.8	42.0	43.8	22.6	21.7
F ratio		3.638	12.564	19.158	1.872	8.942	11.732	5.573	5.582	11.113	12.809
F Probability		.0449	.0003	.0000	.1798	.0017	.0004	.0119	.0118	.0006	.0003
T Probability											
M vs. AA		.041	.009	.923	.452	.077	.028	.064	.066	.100	.074
M vs. EA		.830	.231	.000	.084	.061	.128	.277	.328	.019	.032
Grouping mean					IMMIGRATED 1955+						
AA	5	29.2%	45.4%	23.1%	17.0%	52.4%	63.2%	33.6%	26.5%	9.4%	15.4%
Middle	6	26.2	30.6	14.4	21.4	40.6	52.0	36.3	32.4	19.0	13.0
EA	9	18.1	14.0	11.7	10.3	30.2	34.0	32.7	40.1	38.8	32.7
F Ratio		0.892	11.618	6.069	3.535	2.049	4.877	0.137	2.307	2.695	2.734
F Probability		.4320	.0007	.0126	.0520	.1658	.0247	.8729	.1299	.1023	.0934
T Probability											
M vs. AA		.768	.054	.043	.453	.369	.296	.723	.429	.260	.167
M vs. EA		.383	.060	.373	.053	.354	.114	.665	.288	.230	.049
Grouping mean					ISRAEL-BORN BY FATHER'S COUNTRY OF BIRTH						
AA	7	6.8%	7.8%	31.1%	28.7%	37.4%	36.5%	53.3%	53.2%	7.6%	7.7%
Middle	5	6.7	5.1	23.7	21.7	28.2	26.8	56.9	56.7	9.6	10.6
EA	7	.6	1.3	5.5	4.3	6.1	5.6	56.3	53.6	33.6	38.0
F Ratio		15.013	14.640	52.694	62.667	44.026	77.207	0.314	0.335	48.646	42.380
F Probability		.0003	.0002	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.7347	.7205	.0000	.0000
T Probability											
M vs. AA		.826	.126	.040	.026	.061	.010	.560	.515	.527	.412
M vs. EA		.005	.017	.000	.000	.001	.000	.934	.583	.000	.000

statistically significant entity. While on the one-way analysis of variance all comparisons are significant for the immigrants of 1948-51, most are not so for the immigrants of 1955§. The T test yields significance for only three of 20 comparisons for the 1948-54 group, and none for those of 1955+. Inspection of the data (not presented here) also indicates that many countries, from the EA and AA as well as the middle groupings, display almost random variations among individual comparisons rather than falling consistently into their expected grouping patterns. "Israeli factors" seem clearly to have been at work, and our hypothesis is not supported here.

A surprisingly different result appears, however, for the Israeli-born. Almost half the comparisons (nine out of twenty) are significant on the T test, and eight of those nine occur when the middle grouping is compared to the EAs. Individual country analysis also shows that four of the five middle grouping countries for which we have sufficient data display definite mixed patterns (Egypt, 4 middle, 5 AA, 1 EA; Bulgaria, 3 middle, 5 EA, 2 AA; Greece, 4 middle, 4 AA, 2 EA; Yugoslavia, 5 middle, 4 AA, 1 EA; Turkey, with 7 AA and 3 middle, must be labeled AA). It will take further research to try to specify whether older patterns are reasserting themselves here, but the data bearing on our hypothesis are intriguing.

Hebrew.

One of the foremost challenges facing new immigrants is to learn the language of their new country. A number of factors are likely to be relevant in the degree to which groups and/or individuals do this. In Israel those from EA countries came into a situation where there was considerable use of their own languages, whereas those from countries without extensive use of French, German or English had to acquire a means of communication, in effect Hebrew. Another factor is what might be called Hebrew-language predisposition. Relevant in this case is that many AA groups (such as Yemenites) used much Aramaic as well as Arabic, that they tended to have a good deal more "siddur contact" than many EA groups, and that there are important linguistic affinities between Arabic and Hebrew. A third factor is period of immigration: there appears to be a high correlation between Hebrew fluency and time in the country, and the facilities for formal learning of Hebrew (ulpanim, absorption centers, etc.) were quite different in different periods. Thus we would expect the variety of factors to result, if anything, in the AA groups performing better than the EA ones, and to find weak correlation between education in general and fluency in Hebrew.

Table 6 presents data for 1961 for literacy in Hebrew, and Table 7 for 1972 on Hebrew writing ability. For the most part we find the above-noted pattern. In regard to the middle grouping, however, it has been observed by an Israeli demographer that the Balkan Sephardim are particularly multi-lingual and also that they have made far less effort to learn Hebrew than did the North Africans (U.O. Schmelz, personal communication. See also Schmelz & Bachi, 1975).

Table 6. Percentage Literate in Hebrew, as Percentage of Literate Persons in Group, 1961

Both Sexes, Ages 30-34. Immigrated 1948-54		*Both Sexes, Ages 45-64, Immigrated 1948-54*	
America-Oceania	95.4	Yemen-Aden	82.6
Yemen-Aden	92.1	Other Africa	81.8
Other Africa	86.4	Iraq	68.8
Syria-Lebanon	83.6	America-Oceania	64.1
USSR	81.6	USSR	62.9
Iraq	80.9	Iran	61.0
Germany-Austria	79.9	Syria-Lebanon	60.9
Hungary	79.1	Other Europe	59.3
Other Europe	77.5	Morocco	58.9
Czechoslovakia	75.8	Asia	58.8
Poland	75.4	Poland	58.0
Asia	73.5	Czechoslovakia	57.4
Egypt-Sudan	72.0*	Germany-Austria	52.2
Morocco	71.8	Egypt-Sudan	51.2*
TOTAL	71.5	TOTAL	49.3
Europe-America	71.3	Africa	49.1
Africa	69.1	Libya	49.0
Yugoslavia	69.0*	Europe-America	47.4
Iran	67.8	Hungary	47.1
Libya	67.4	Yugoslavia	43.0*
Other Asia	67.4	Other Asia	42.7
Bulgaria	66.3*	Bulgaria	39.2*
Algeria-Tunisia	61.3	Algeria-Tunisia	36.9
Greece	52.5*	Greece	28.3*
Turkey	44.7*	Turkey	28.2*

* Middle grouping country

Grouping means		Grouping means	
AA	75.4	AA	60.3
Middle	60.9	Middle	38.0
EA	80.7	EA	57.3
F Ratio	5.698	F Ratio	6.255
F Probability	.0144	F Probability	.0106
T Probability		T Probability	
M vs. AA	.058	M vs. AA	.016
M vs. EA	.007	M vs. EA	.004

AA countries: Yemen-Aden, Other Africa, Syria-Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Iran, Libya, Other Asia, Algeria, Tunisia.

EA countries: America-Oceania, USSR, Germany-Austria, Hungary, Other Europe, Czechoslovakia, Poland.

This is in large part confirmed by the statistics. For Hebrew literacy (Table 6) all except one comparison in both the F and T tests are significant. A similar comparison (not presented here), using a Hebrew-speaking index, does not yield significant differences, although the trends are in the same direction.

By 1972 we might have expected many of the specific factors to have reduced impact, and the data to reflect more accurately integration into Israeli society. Unfortunately we lack data on the same items as for 1961, but the measure available to us – writing knowledge – is sufficient for an indication relevant to this study.[6]

An important overall finding is that in all except a very few instances there is consistency between the F and T tests, i.e. where there are visible groupings they are clear between both middle vs. AA and middle vs. EA, and where they are not visible there are also few two-group contrasts.

On specific items in Table 7, (a) the figures for males and females who cannot write

Table 7. Writing Knowledge 1972, Percentages.

	Males						Females					
	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	F
	Cannot write	Hebrew only	B/(A+B)	Own but no Hebrew	Own and Hebrew	D/(D+E)	Cannot write	Hebrew only	A/(A+B)	Own but no Hebrew	Own and Hebrew	D/(D+E)
AA Grouping												
Syria	13.1	37.7	74	20.8	42.1	33	25.0	32.7	57	25.0	32.7	43
Lebanon	14.6	27.1	65	12.6	43.8	22	25.4	28.8	53	8.5	33.9	20
Iraq	19.0	34.7	65	3.6	38.9	8	33.7	30.1	45	3.8	28.9	12
Yemen	23.1	55.3	71	1.2	17.5	6	36.9	42.4	52	.8	16.0	5
Iran	24.1	33.8	58	6.2	33.3	16	30.4	33.2	52	6.2	26.9	13
Afghanistan	8.6	46.6	84	1.7	37.9	4	23.9	54.3	69	4.4	15.2	22
Morocco	25.4	30.4	54	5.5	35.8	13	37.4	22.5	38	9.7	26.7	27
Algeria	17.7	23.2	57	8.3	47.6	15	27.2	19.8	42	13.4	34.7	28
Tunisia	24.6	28.9	54	8.5	35.0	20	32.4	24.8	43	12.6	26.2	32
Libya	21.2	38.3	64	4.2	31.8	12	31.9	32.7	51	8.6	24.1	27
Average	19.1	35.6	65	7.3	36.4	15	30.4	32.1	50	9.2	26.5	23
Middle Grouping												
Turkey	14.2	26.7	55	16.0	40.8	28	22.2	23.5	51	18.0	32.1	36
Egypt	14.8	22.6	60	6.8	53.1	11	13.8	22.9	62	13.7	44.9	23
Yugoslavia	4.2	16.8	80	12.7	58.9	18	11.5	11.5	50	17.7	55.2	24
Bulgaria	7.4	12.9	64	14.6	63.1	19	8.6	12.4	59	21.7	53.2	29
Greece	11.4	28.6	72	8.0	50.3	14	20.9	20.3	49	18.6	37.2	33
India-Pakistan	19.4	19.4	50	20.0	37.2	35	20.4	15.4	43	25.3	34.9	42
Spain	23.5	20.6	47	14.7	26.8	29	29.7	17.2	37	17.2	31.3	29
Italy	9.4	37.7	80	3.8	47.2	7	19.6	17.9	48	10.7	50.0	18
Argentina	11.4	3.4	23	9.1	26.1	11	12.2	2.2	15	12.2	72.2	14
Average	12.9	21.0	60	11.7	51.5	19	17.7	15.9	46	17.2	45.7	31

Table 7 / continued . . .

EA Grouping												
USSR	4.4	15.7	78	9.6	68.0	12	5.6	11.5	67	14.3	65.7	18
Poland	5.1	11.7	70	6.4	74.2	8	6.1	9.4	61	12.8	69.6	16
Romania	7.5	8.4	53	19.4	62.2	24	7.5	6.2	45	33.0	50.5	40
Germany	5.2	11.4	69	3.8	77.0	5	5.2	8.7	63	10.6	74.2	12
Austria	4.2	7.2	63	4.2	83.2	5	3.7	4.8	56	17.1	72.7	19
Czechoslovakia	7.8	9.6	55	6.6	73.9	8	8.4	8.6	51	14.8	66.4	18
Hungary	10.2	9.1	47	10.1	67.9	13	8.2	8.7	51	22.4	57.4	28
UK	*15.9	4.5	22	20.5	56.8	27	7.2	2.9	29	14.5	75.3	16
France	*16.2	14.9	48	8.1	55.5	13	*15.3	8.7	36	8.7	64.2	12
USA	*20.7	7.2	26	9.0	58.6	13	*14.8	.8	5	10.7	73.0	13
Average	9.7	10.1	53	9.8	68.2	13	6.5	7.0	46	15.9	66.9	19

* Possible census error.

	F Ratio	F Probability	T Probability M vs. AA	M vs. EA
		MALES		
Cannot write	13.130	.0002	.030	.016
Hebrew only	25.259	.0000	.004	.004
B/(A+B)	1.277	.2978	.502	.941
Own but no Hebrew	1.523	.2368	.096	.444
Own and Hebrew	23.239	.0000	.007	.006
D/(D+E)	1.704	.2017	.326	.152
		FEMALES		
Cannot write	52.720	.0000	.000	.000
Hebrew only	30.864	.0000	.001	.002
B/(A+B)	.252	.7790	.437	.959
Own but no Hebrew	4.464	.0216	.008	.636
Own and Hebrew	43.640	.0000	.001	.001
D/(D+E)	1.728	.1975	.380	.053

those who could not write in 1972 were those who immigrated as illiterates, and that the proportion of those who have not improved over the roughly twenty years in Israel continues to reflect the educational factors discussed above. (To eliminate those who are not *yet* able to write, we have adjusted the data to include only persons who in 1972 were aged 10 and above.)

(b) The category of writing "Hebrew only" presumably relates for the most part to persons who were unable to write at the time of immigration, but who learned after arrival in Israel. (We can assume, from other evidence, that those who were literate in another language did not generally lose that literacy.) The figures here also show three groupings, which is to be expected. It is enlightening, however, to calculate the numbers of those who write Hebrew only, as a percentage of "Hebrew only" plus "cannot write." This presumably gives us a percentage of those who were unable to write at immigration, but who subsequently learned to write Hebrew. On this index for males and females (Columns C) it is notable that although there were differences among individual country

groups, the differences among the three major groupings disappear. Presumably the situational factors within Israel which we think have influenced Hebrew speaking (and to some extent Hebrew literacy) in the 1961 data can be seen to have worked here as well.

(c) Some interesting differences relevant to the middle grouping hypothesis show up in the next category – males and females who do not write Hebrew but do write some other language (columns D). These are probably persons who were literate on immigration but who have not felt it necessary to acquire Hebrew writing ability. Although the overall variance among groupings is not statistically significant for males, with considerable heterogeneity within each grouping, inspection shows the somewhat unusual occurrence that the middle grouping countries have higher percentages than either the EA or AA groupings. This would seem to confirm our observation vis à vis the 1961 Hebrew data, that the middle grouping countries contrasted with EA ones which had a stronger educational tradition but might also have had less need for Hebrew since European languages were in wide use in Israel. They also contrasted with the AA countries, which needed Hebrew intensively for social and economic mobility.

(d) Finally, among males and females who write Hebrew plus another language, i.e. those who were literate on immigration and later learned Hebrew, the three major groupings are again statistically significant. Since, however, this is also partly a function of the three groupings' percentage of writing knowledge in their pre-immigration languages, we again chose to examine the proportion of all those who write another language and who did or did not add Hebrew (Columns F). While we find that the analysis of variance is not statistically significant for either men or women, inspection of the figures again shows that the middle grouping displays more consistent high levels of "own language but no Hebrew," leading us to conclude yet again that while individual in-Israel factors remain relevant, those which particularly affected the middle grouping seem to have been stronger for those countries.

In sum, on many items of Hebrew the middle grouping, even thought it is not located in the "middle" numerically, is nevertheless a distinct one, and our hypothesis can be said to be supported.

Occupations

We have data on occupations for three points in time: prior to immigration, in 1961, and in 1972. There are shortcomings to the data because the definitions and categories often vary (because of variations from country to country, due to changes in the Israeli statistics themselves, and because occupation data is often self-reported and its accuracy cannot be controlled); because the categories are broad and do not reflect different levels of skills; and because criteria of occupational prestige and desirability which both the society and individual groups attribute to various occupations lead to difficulty in interpreting the meaning of the patterns. Occupations also probably reflect (to a greater degree than some other indicators used in this study) a variety of factors from earlier periods, such as skills prior to immigration, the age structure of the group, and the period of immigration, which were closely connected with occupational opportunities. 1972 data appear in Table 8.
(column 5A) show a clear division into three groupings, with large intervals and a clear middle grouping. Since we are surveying only the foreign-born, we can assume that

Table 8. Occupations 1972.

	Scientific	Technical	Admin./ Managerial	Clerical	Sales	Service	Skilled Workers	Unskilled Workers	Overall Profile
Grouping means									
AA	1.0	7.7	.9	14.0	6.6	16.0	38.1	7.9	
Middle	6.2	11.5	2.8	16.1	9.2	11.8	33.6	5.1	
EA	14.9	19.4	5.2	21.5	8.7	6.3	17.1	2.4	
Middle Grouping Countries									
Turkey	AA	AA	AA	AA	M	M	AA	AA	AA
India-Pakistan	M	AA	AA	EA	AA	EA	M	AA	Mixed
Egypt	AA	M	M	EA	AA	EA	M	M	Mixed
Yugoslavia	M	EA	EA	M	M	M	EA	M	Middle
Bulgaria	M	M	EA	M	M	M	M	M	Middle
Greece	AA	AA	EA	M	M	M	AA	AA	Mixed
Spain	AA	AA	M	AA	AA	EA	AA	AA	AA
Italy	EA	M	M	EA	EA	EA	M	EA	EA
Argentina	M	EA	AA	AA	M	M	M	AA	Mixed
AA countries closer to middle mean than to AA mean		Alg Syr	Lib	Syr Iraq Alg	Syr Iraq Iran	Syr Iraq Lib	Syr Iraq	Syr Yem	Syr mixed Iraq mixed
EA countries closer to middle mean than to EA mean	Pol Rom Cz Hng Br	Rom	Rom Fr	Rom US	Fr US	Rom Hng	Rom	Rom	Rom mid.

Analysis of Variance

	F Ratio	F Probability	T Probability M vs. AA	T Probability M vs. EA
Scientific	10.982	.0004	.009	.023
Technical	17.963	.0000	.125	.003
Admin./Managerial	13.500	.0001	.006	.023
Clerical	5.488	.0109	.255	.047
Sales	1.163	.3296	.200	.758
Service	12.241	.0002	.096	.015
Skilled Workers	19.200	.0000	.281	.000
Unskilled Workers	12.005	.0002	.057	.040

Scientific, technical, administrative/managerial. These are probably the most prestigious categories, and very closely linked to educational factors, many of which were carried over from the pre-immigration period. On all three, the differences among the groupings are large, and all the F tests and five of the six T tests are significant.

Unskilled workers. For those at the bottom of the employment ladder, we also find a clear progression among the three groupings, although the T test is only suggestive of significance. Of the five countries in the middle of the range only three (Egypt, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria) are middle grouping countries, while two are from the AA grouping (Syria and Yemen), and one is from the EAs (Romania). There is no strong support here for the hypothesis.

Commercial. This is an important category because self-employment is important to immigrants to Israel from many countries, who often engaged in commercial occupations in their native lands. If we can assume that many wanted to continue in those fields, or at least not to experience downward status mobility by having to become workers, we can devise a measure for occupational continuity, as we have done in Table 9. We also

Table 9. Continuity in Rankings of Commercial Occupations

Country	Percent Commercial Abroad	Rank	Percent Commercial in Israel 1961	Rank	Change in Rank
Iran	65.7	1	6.0	12	-11
Syria-Lebanon	46.0	—	no data	—	—
Romania	44.0	2	12.3	2	0
*Turkey	37.2	3	11.0	4	-1
*Bulgaria	36.5	4	14.8	1	+3
Czechoslovakia	36.0	5	10.7	6.5	-1.5
*Greece	35.4	6	8.3	10	-4
Hungary	34.7	7	10.7	6.5	+0.5
Libya	33.9	8	6.1	11	-3
Iraq	33.0	9	8.6	9	0
Morocco	32.2	10	3.2	17	-7
*Egypt-Sudan	28.2	11	3.9	15	-4
Algeria-Tunisia	26.8	12	4.2	14	-2
Poland	26.5	13	10.9	5	+8
Yemen	25.2	14	2.4	18	-4
USSR	24.9	15	8.8	8	+7
*Yugoslavia	24.3	16	12.0	3	+13
Germany-Austria	21.0	17	4.3	13	+4
USA	12.5	18	3.5	16	+2

* Middle grouping country

know that the immigrants often found that there was little opportunity to go into commerce. This was because the sector was manned by veterans, because there was a greater demand for industrial and agricultural workers, or because start-up capital was often lacking. Thus we can speculate that a group desiring to continue to engage in commerce is strong if it can maintain a high level in this field. That the middle grouping countries have done well in this is attested to by the following data:

(a) When we compare a rank order of "commercial occupations abroad" with those continuing in the same work in the 1961 census data (Table 9), we find that the two middle grouping countries (Turkey, Bulgaria) which were near the top of the scale in 1961 maintained high positions in 1972, and Yugoslavia moved up sharply.

(b) In the 1972 data (Table 8) it is difficult to pick out the commercial occupations other than the category of "sales," but here we confirm the finding of the earlier data, namely that not only is the average for the middle grouping as a whole higher than for both the AA and the EA groupings, but that the Balkan Sephardim (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece) and Turkey are in the upper part of the list. It is possible to speculate, therefore, that a characteristic of many middle grouping countries is not only determination to continue in earlier occupations, but also greater ability to do so than the AA countries.

"Remainder" categories. After deducting the categories which presumably have the greatest and the least attraction, we are left with "remainders." The least clear pattern is for clerical workers. Here we find eight countries in the middle of the scale, three from the middle grouping, three AAs and two EAs. This may be due to a fairly general definition of this category, and to its overlapping with some of the others. A clearer pattern is in "services," where the grouping averages appear at larger intervals, and in which five of the ten countries in the middle of the range are from our middle grouping. Clearest of these "remainder" occupations is that of "skilled workers." We can speculate that this was also the category which involved the greatest occupational change for most of the immigrants, since most of those who moved into it may earlier have been in the ranks of the unskilled. It is noteworthy, therefore, that of the eight countries which occupy the center section of the scale, five are from our middle grouping.

To summarize, the pattern of occupations is complex and needs deeper analysis. At first glance, however, even Turkey, the middle grouping country which falls most consistently into one of the other grouping patterns, has at least two categories on which it falls into the "middle." Moreover, as seen in Table 8, all except three of our middle grouping countries emerge as "middle" or "mixed" when we view the occupational categories as a whole. The hypothesis of this study receives at least tentative support.

Intermarriage

Israel keeps particularly good statistics on marriages between persons from the same country and the same continent. Data are available for each year covering all those marrying in that year. The figures presented here are for intervals from the first to the most recently available year (1979).

One of the unique concepts devised by Israeli statisticians is the "attraction index." The index is a measure of those marrying persons from the same country of origin or whose father is from the same country. It uses a formula which takes into account factors such as the size of the overall available "marriage pool" for each country. The index is, therefore, not directly relatable to the figures for the straight percentage of persons marrying someone from the same country of origin, to be discussed later in this section. It should also be noted that explaining marriage patterns is an extremely complicated matter, in that it involves numerous factors. Matras, for example, cites at least four which must be considered: residential concentration, rates of school attendance and educational achievement, the absolute size of and the age distribution within each origin group, and the degree to which matchmaking is in the hands of the young persons themselves (Matras, 1973).

Table 10. Attraction Indices

1952		1962		1972		1979	
Iraq	.92	Yemen	.82	MorAlgTun	.55	USSR	.75
Libya	.91	MorAlgTun	.74	Iran	.50	Iran	.44
Yemen	.85	Iraq	.70	Yemen	.49	Iraq	.37
MorAlgTun	.77	Libya	.61	Romania	.44	Yemen	.36
Iran	.71	Iran	.60	USSR	.41	*Argentina	.35
Romania	.70	Romania	.58	Iraq	.39	Morocco	.34
*Turkey	.67	IEA	.56	IEA	.39	Romania	.32
*Bulgaria	.65	Poland	.48	IAA	.39	Poland	.28
Poland	.59	*Turkey	.45	*Turkey	.38	*Turkey	.27
IEA	.46	*Bulgaria	.37	*Argentina	.30	Libya	.22
*Egypt	.43	*Egypt	.36	Libya	.30	*Bulg.Gr.	.21
IAA	.40	IAA	.36	*Bulg.Gr.	.29	*Egypt	.18
SyrLeb.	.39	*Argentina	.34	Poland	.27	USA	.18
Hungary	.33	SyrLeb	.29	SyrLeb.	.21	Hungary	.17
*Yugoslavia	.32	Hungary	.28	Hungary	.16	AlgTun.	.17
GerAus.	.31	GerAus.	.26	USA	.16	SyrLeb.	.15
*Argentina	.28	*Yugoslavia	.18	*Egypt	.14	GerAus.	.13
Czech.	.25	USSR	.18	Czech.	.13	Czech.	.11
USSR	.19	Czech.	.16	*Yugoslavia	.12		
		USA	.12	GerAus.	.06		
Grouping Averages							
AA	.76	AA	.64	AA	.43	AA	.29
Middle	.42	Middle	.33	Middle	.25	Middle	.25
EA	.40	EA	.29	EA	.23	EA	.20
F ratio	7.309	F ratio	9.104	F ratio	4.504	F ratio	1.592
F prob.	.0067	F prob.	.0026	F prob.	.0281	F prob.	.2383
T prob.		T prob.		T prob.		T prob.	
M vs. AA	.021	M vs. AA	.006	M vs. AA	.024	M vs. AA	.408
M vs. EA	.539	M vs. EA	.608	M vs. EA	.778	M vs. EA	.353

* Middle Grouping country.
AA countries: Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Iran, Syria Lebanon.
EA countries: Romania, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, USSR, USA.

As seen in Table 10, over the years the attraction indices for Israel as a whole have gone down continually. For our current discussion, while the F test shows a significant three-grouping pattern up to 1972, it is perhaps more important that on the T test the distinction is strong only between the middle and the AA groupings, and that persons from middle grouping countries seem to have been willing and/or able to mix to a degree which is comparable to that of the EAs. It is only in the 1979 data that the AAs mix to a similar degree. An analysis on the basis of marriage with persons not from the same country but from the same continent of origin yielded no statistically significant results, and on the intermarriage indicator as a whole our hypothesis seems to have little relevance.

Residence

Data are available on residential concentration, i.e. the extent to which particular quarters of Israeli cities and towns, as well as towns as a whole, contain concentrations of persons from certain countries of origin. The data are particularly useful because they are identical for both the 1961 and 1972 censuses, and they are broken down for those born abroad and those born in Israel according to father's country of origin. Thus we are able to examine the degree to which each of these groups has changed or maintained degrees of concentration, and has retained patterns which were set by a number of factors that constituted a far from "free housing market" at the time most of the groups arrived in Israel.

Period of immigration is a particularly important factor in the establishment of initial residence patterns. One aspect was simply availability. For example, many locations, especially smaller settlements, were vacated by Arabs during the War of Independence. Another fact was that by about 1957, during the second large wave of post-state immigration, newcomers were already being sent to more rural and development areas. It must, however, also be noted that Jewish Agency policy over the years has vacillated between keeping groups together and mixing them into the general population. Socio-economic factors are relevant in that when new housing did become available it was the more advantaged groups which were best able to move.

These factors are especially relevant to patterns within towns and cities, where movement was presumably easier than between towns, and the data in this study are for the three principal cities of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa. These data are also limited, though, in that they apply to relatively large quarters and sub-quarters, and do not show smaller variations.[8]

The statistical technique used here is the Index of Dissimilarity. The hypothesis is that the greatest degree of concentration (and the highest indices) will be found among the AA groups, which are often lower class and thus less able to move into new areas and which are often culturally different from the dominant population groups. In addition, the most even scattering will be among the EAs, who are wealthier, who have had a longer time in which to be able to disperse and whose need to be with a similar origin group has had more time to diminish.

The data in Table 11 indicate that there was considerable change between 1961 and 1972. In the earlier year, differences among our three groupings (F test) were statistically significant in five of seven cases, but by 1972 only two out of eight remained so. It is noteworthy that both of the latter related to persons born abroad. It is also notable, however, that when we inspect the indices for individual cities, arranged from highest to lowest (some samples appear in Table 12) we see that while all but two of the values for 1972 for Jerusalem and half of the values for Tel Aviv and Haifa are smaller (more integrated) than for 1961, overall patterns of the AA countries still appear at the higher end of the scale and the EAs at the lower, with few exceptions. Moreover, in almost all the distributions, the middle grouping countries continue to fall quite often near the middle. We can point out finally that on the T test, all of the four instances on which there is significance in either 1961 or 1972 are located between the middle and the AA groupings, indicating, as we speculated in the section on attraction indices, a greater openness towards (or tolerance of) the middle groupings than the AAs in Israeli society.

These findings are also supported by the work of two Israeli sociologists. Kraus and Klaff used the Index of Dissimilarity as well as Smallest Space Analysis not only to

Table 11. Statistical Significance of Residential Concentration Index Distributions Among Groupings.

	1961		1972	
Place	Born abroad	Born in Israel	Born abroad	Born in Israel
Jerusalem	AA mean .382	AA mean .427	AA mean .310	AA mean .289
	Mid mean .342	Mid mean .278	Mid mean .274	Mid mean .229
	EA mean .285	EA mean .290	EA mean .212	EA mean .230
	F ratio 3.058	F ratio 2.580	F ratio 0.445	F ratio 0.846
	F prob. .0750	F prob. .1069	F prob. .6478	F prob. .4466
	T prob.			
	M vs. AA .391	M vs. AA .119	M vs. AA .415	M vs. AA .430
	M vs. EA .164	M vs. EA .798	M vs. EA .701	M vs. EA .995
Tel Aviv	AA mean .474	AA mean .484	AA mean .434	AA mean .438
	Mid mean .302	Mid mean .347	Mid mean .319	Mid mean .265
	EA mean .286	EA mean .279	EA mean .304	EA mean .319
	F ratio 11.478	F ratio 5.450	F ratio 6.600	F ratio 3.216
	F prob. .0009	F prob. .0166	F prob. .0081	F prob. .0670
	T prob.			
	M vs. AA .013	M vs. AA .168	M vs. AA .008	M vs. AA .032
	M vs. EA .736	M vs. EA .042	M vs. EA .218	M vs. EA .818
Haifa	AA mean .392	AA mean .435	AA mean .278	AA mean .277
	Mid mean .275	Mid mean .275	Mid mean .266	Mid mean .254
	EA mean .217	EA mean .214	EA mean .203	EA mean .210
	F ratio 12.736	F ratio 13.450	F ratio 0.746	F ratio 0.693
	F prob. .0005	F prob. .0004	F prob. .4892	F prob. .5136
	T prob.			
	M vs. AA .013	M vs. AA .010	M vs. AA .469	M vs. AA .852
	M vs. EA .102	M vs. EA .161	M vs. EA .652	M vs. EA .449

	1961	1972	
Place	Born in Israel	Born abroad	Born in Israel
All towns over 20,000	AA mean .311		
	Mid mean .294		
	EA mean .158		
	F ratio 7.935		
	F prob. .0056		
	T prob.		
	M vs. AA .735		
	M vs. EA .001		
Districts and sub-districts, entire country		AA mean .313	AA mean .313
		Mid mean .299	Mid mean .270
		EA mean .166	EA mean .170
		F ratio 6.109	F ratio 2.790
		F prob. .0100	F prob. .0896
		T prob.	
		M vs. AA .557	M vs. AA .812
		M vs. EA .174	M vs. EA .027

Number of cases varies. See samples in following table.

Table 12. Indices of Residential Concentration.

Jerusalem 1961				Jerusalem 1972			
Born in Israel		Born Abroad		Born in Israel		Born Abroad	
Romania	.116	Romania	.184	Romania	.117	Egypt-Sudan	.152*
Iran	.229	Hungary	.235	Syria-Lebanon	.140	Romania	.165
Egypt-Sudan	.237*	Egypt-Sudan	.256*	Yemen	.140	Bulg.-Greece	.178*
Czech.	.239	Czech.	.278	Czech.	.199	USSR	.187
Yemen	.259	USSR	.292	Hungary	.203	Hungary	.202
Yugoslavia	.260*	Poland	.294	Egypt-Sudan	.208*	Czech.	.238
USSR	.276	North America	.295	Bulg.-Greece	.216*	Alg.-Tun.	.241
Greece	.281*	Iran	.295	Poland	.225	Turkey	.262*
Bulgaria	.286*	Yemen	.299	Iran	.232	Poland	.270
Hungary	.293	Yugoslavia	.321*	USSR	.232	Iran	.292
Poland	.310	Alg.-Tun.	.338	Turkey	.240*	Syria-Lebanon	.298
Turkey	.324*	Bulgaria	.355*	India-Pak.	.251*	Yemen	.317
Iraq	.325	Syria-Lebanon	.364	Iraq	.292	Iraq	.336
Syria-Lebanon	.352	Iraq	.380	North America	.302	Morocco	.373
Ger.-Aus.	.386	Greece	.386*	Ger.-Aus.	.334	Ger.-Aus.	.329
North America	.407	Turkey	.392*	Alg.-Tun.	.362	Latin America	.505*
Morocco	.512	Ger.-Aus.	.415	Libya	.429		
Alg.-Tun.	.549	Libya	.476	Morocco	.430		
Libya	.766	Morocco	.519				

Continued on following page . . .

Table 12 / continued . . . Indices of Residential Concentration

Tel Aviv 1972				Haifa 1972			
Born in Israel		Born Abroad		Born in Israel		Born Abroad	
India-Pak.	.173*	Romania	.173	Hungary	.100	USSR	.118
Romania	.204	USSR	.213	Romania	.137	Hungary	.120
Egypt-Sudan	.251*	Egypt-Sudan	.239*	Czech.	.141	Turkey	.134*
Hungary	.271	Hungary	.242	Poland	.151	Romania	.154
Iraq	.279	Czech.	.276	Iran	.164	Poland	.162
Latin America	.281*	Iraq	.283	Bulg.-Greece	.174*	Czech.	.166
USSR	.283	Poland	.313	USSR	.195	Syria-Lebanon	.180
Czech.	.304	India-Pak.	.315*	Turkey	.196*	Bulg.-Greece	.189*
Turkey	.307*	Latin America	.316*	Yemen	.215	Alg.-Tun.	.217
Bulg.-Greece	.314*	Ger.-Aus.	.330	Latin America	.218*	Egypt-Sudan	.233*
Syria-Lebanon	.316	Turkey	.352*	Ger.-Aus.	.244	Iran	.262
Poland	.360	Syria-Lebanon	.353	Alg.-Tun.	.248	Iraq	.275
Ger.-Aus.	.374	Bulg.-Greece	.374*	Egypt-Sudan	.253*	Yemen	.288
Iran	.437	Alg.-Tun.	.401	Syria-Lebanon	.262	Ger.-Aus.	.270
North America	.438	Libya	.453	Iraq	.314	Latin America	.304*
Yemen	.440	Yemen	.507	Libya	.354	Morocco	.347
Alg.-Tun.	.495	Iran	.516	Morocco	.384	North America	.428
Libya	.542	Morocco	.526	India-Pak.	.430*	India-Pak.	.469
Morocco	.554	North America	.582	North America	.501		

* Middle Grouping country.
AA countries: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco.
EA countries: Romania, Hungary, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Germany, Austria, North America.

measure spatial closeness, but also to relate it to social distance between country-of-origin groups. The statistically strongest item is Klaff's measurement of distance from a "core or reference society," in this case, Russians. He found that European communities fell into a range from 7 to 23, Asians 32-39, North Africans 55-62, and that "a fourth group, with IDs ranging from 26 to 32 consists of those three communities which are 'mixed,' either European-Sephardic (Turkey, Bulgaria) or Oriental-Sephardic (Egypt)" (Klaff, 1977). Evidence from another of Klaff's analyses is more impressionistic, but in the same direction. In a spatial analysis for 1961 of 22 country groups in each of Israel's three main cities he found that in each there were quite distinct clusters, separately for Jews of Western origin and, within the Oriental group, separate clusters for Asians and for Africans. Inspection of his figures indicated that there were several countries which were distinct in that they (1) were considerably further from the center of their respective clusters than most countries in their group, and (2) were considerably closer to the demarcation lines between the clusters. When I tabulated which countries met both these criteria, the middle grouping hypothesis received some support. In Tel Aviv, 4 of 5 middle countries did so, compared to only 2 of 7 AAs and none of the 8 EAs. In Haifa it was 2 of the 5 middle, 2 of the 7 AAs, and only one of the 9 EAs. In Jerusalem 3 of the 5 middle countries met the conditions, and only one each from the AAs and EAs. Klaff (1972: Figures 1-3). These findings are also strengthened by the analysis of 1972 census data by Kraus, who obtained results which she called "almost identical" (no date: 14, Figure 1). In Tel Aviv, for example, out of a total of 23 countries, seven met the criteria just stated, and of the seven, four were from our middle grouping. Further analysis of these studies is warranted but is beyond the scope of the present article.

CONCLUSION

While more detailed calculations of quantitative data remain to be done, the evidence presented in this article suggests at least that on some important socio-economic dimensions there is, in addition to the two major Asian-African and European-American groupings which are usually used to describe Israel, a discernible middle grouping, made up for the most part of the non-Oriental Sephardim. To summarize only the major overall highlights, the three-grouping distinction is clearest on those indicators which we can most unambiguously call "modern-traditional" (numbers of children, age at marriage, male-female differences in education), but it is also visible on items which are less closely tied to such categories (for example several occupational groups, and knowledge of Hebrew). It is also notable that the significance of many of the indicators remains as high in the 1972 census data as it was for the data of 1961. It is true that the 1972 data also include persons counted in 1961 and that therefore one should only expect modifications rather than large changes. However, the persistence of the grouping distinctions in 1972 should revive interest in the question of the relative importance of what we might call "in-Israel" factors (presumably leading to steadily reduced group distinctions) as contrasted to factors carrying over from immigrants' countries of origin. The 1983 census data should throw important new light on this question. We have also seen that, while among the countries hypothesized to be in the "middle grouping" there are often large differences, each nonetheless falls into the "middle" on a considerable number of the indicators which we were able to measure. In contrast the number of AA and EA countries which are exceptions to the clearly defined AA and EA grouping patterns is quite small on most of the indicators.

If place of origin is as important a part of the identity of Israelis as analysts and observers seem to believe almost unanimously, it is therefore quite conceivable to wonder whether those who are members of country-of-origin groups which have a foot in each of the two area groupings may not also have undergone experiences and influences in becoming positioned in Israeli society differing from those of the EA and AA groups. These could give us important information about factors which may be related to "successful" adaptation to their new country's structure and culture. An important gap in our knowledge exists because, among other things, the studies to date have almost always focused on what may be called the "top" and the "bottom." There has been research on the Moroccans, for example, because they were seen as "problems," and on Americans and Russians because they are of intense interest to the Israeli authorities which are anxious to attract more of them. Although the general studies often include some possible "middle grouping" countries, they are only seldom treated in terms of a distinct category. For a fuller understanding of the dynamics of the emerging Israeli society, and for contributions to the broader field of "integration" studies, some potentially very fruitful areas remain to be explored.

FOOTNOTES

1 The term "groups" will be used hereafter to refer to individual country-of-origin communities, "grouping" to the broader AA, EA and middle categories.

2 This is a statistical technique which compares variations across groupings with variations within groupings, as defined by the independent variable, and tests the patterns for statistical significance. On the F test, significance increases when the F ratio is high, and the conventional criterion is that there is statistical significance when the F probability is .05 and below. On the T test significance is usually considered to exist at the .025 level and below, although some consider that a level of .05 or below is an indicator of at least *some* significance.

3 It would have been technically preferable to measure countries which fall more than 1 or 1.96 standard deviations away from their grouping mean, but there is so much overlap on such a scale that the methodological difficulties are formidable, and not necessary for an appreciation of the suggestiveness of our data.

4 We also have data for sub-groups, such as women married abroad or married in Israel, and fertility abroad and in Israel. However, the latter data are often not broken down by parents' country of origin, and in many of the sub-groups, the numbers are often too small for useful analysis.

5 The samples are not independent since the persons who married in 1954 and 1958 are included in the figures for the 1961 census. All of these persons, as well as those married in 1962, are included in the data for the 1972 census.

6 Writing knowledge could also have been classified under education, but since the thrust of the data is on writing in a particular language, it seems more appropriate here.

7 An analytical problem arises here in that in some countries the commerce category included such lowly occupations as street peddlers. It is quite possible that, for peddlers, commerce carried scant prestige, and that they would be ready to change occupations. Unfortunately, the data do not make these distinctions.

8 One analyst has remarked to me, for example, that in Jerusalem there are long-established patterns of small clusters, a sort of polka-dot pattern, which often started when overseas groups built separate housing estates, and it was only later that the land between them began to be filled in and gradual mixing took place (Prof. U.O. Schmelz, private communication).

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